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Abstract
This paper provides a model of how media environments aect political polarization. We rst
develop a model of how media environments, characterized by their levels of accessibility and variety of
content, interact with citizens' ideological views and attitudes and political motivation. We then embed
it in a model of majoritarian electoral competition in which politicians react to those media-inuenced
views. We show how equilibrium polarization is aected by changes in the media environment, through
two channels: the variety eect, whereby a decrease in media variety leads to convergence in citizens'
views and hence to lower polarization; and the composition eect, whereby a lowering of barriers to
media accessibility increases turnout and hence lowers polarization, since newly motivated voters are
relatively more moderate. We take the model's predictions to the data, in the US context of the
introduction of broadcast TV, in the 1940s and 1950s, and radio, in the 1920s and 1930s. We show
that, consistent with the model's predictions, TV decreased polarization, and exposure to (network)
radio was correlated with lower polarization. The evidence suggests that the variety eect was more
important than the composition eect.
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Polarization has been one of the dominant themes in discussions of US politics in recent years. The recent
rise in partisan polarization, starting in the 1970s, has been well-documented by scholars (Sinclair 2006,
McCarty et al 2007) and widely discussed by pundits and commentators (Dionne 2004, Krugman 2004,
inter alia).1 Of most concern to economists, the policy consequences of polarization are very important.
There is strong evidence that it is associated with increased levels of gridlock in the political system
(Binder 1999, Jones 2001), which in turn means much reduced rates of policy innovation and a decreased
ability to adapt to changes in economic, social, or demographic circumstances (McCarty 2007).2 These
concerns, of course, are not limited to the US or to developed democracies (e.g. Ellner and Hellinger
2003, on Venezuela).
What explains these movements in polarization? Many hypotheses have been raised and confronted,
ranging from changes in political or electoral institutions to big societal shifts such as inequality and
immigration patterns (McCarty et al 2007). While all of these may have played important roles, one
element is often mentioned as an important driver and propagator of those movements: the role of a
changing media landscape. There has been growing evidence to substantiate the widespread perception
that the introduction of dierent media technologies has had substantial impact on political outcomes
(Stromberg 2004, Gentzkow 2006, Gentzkow et al. 2009), and on individual views and attitudes on and
beyond politics (Della Vigna and Kaplan 2007, Gentzkow and Shapiro 2004, Gerber et al. 2009, Jensen
and Oster 2009, La Ferrara et al. 2008). In other words, the media help propagate and diuse views
and attitudes, with whatever explicitly political content that they carry, but also with entertainment
content that often conveys subtle or less-than-subtle ideological cues { movies, soap operas, talk shows,
even sports features. All of these should aect individuals' views and political behavior, and it is only
natural that this would translate into an impact on polarization.3
But how are we to think of the connection between media and polarization? After all, dierent
channels may be in play. On the one hand, it has been argued that new media technologies have tended
to increase polarization, as crystalized in the so-called \echo chamber" argument (Bishop 2008, Sunstein
2009): new media such as cable TV or the internet have allowed individuals to select media outlets
that conform to their prior ideological views, thus reinforcing polarization. On the opposite direction, a
longstanding view on \mainstreaming" (Gerbner et al. 1980) has held that mass media have tended to
induce conformity and lower polarization. We thus need a framework that is able to encompass these
1Fiorina (2006) argues that the rise in polarization, while very real, is a phenomenon restricted to partisan elites, and
not true of the general public.
2Interestingly, this rise in polarization followed a substantial drop in the preceding half-century, which at the time
highlighted negative eects of a depolarized polity in terms of demobilization in the face of a lack of clear choices (APSA,
1950).
3Note in particular that this does not imply or require that the media are the original source of those shifts; more often
than not they will rather amplify movements originated elsewhere. By the same token, this does not imply or require that
they propagate specic views with a deliberate political agenda, nor that individuals are passive consumers of those views.
1dierent possibilities and illuminate how they will play out in equilibrium.
Our paper proposes such a conceptual framework, to make sense of the links between media en-
vironments and political polarization. We start by characterizing a media environment according to
two central dimensions: accessibility (or barriers, for short-hand) and variety. The former refers to the
fact that dierent media technologies impose dierent intrinsic barriers to access by consumers, whether
driven by regulation (e.g. licenses), supply factors (e.g. prices, coverage), and/or demand-side factors
such as cognitive barriers { for instance, newspapers or blogs require an ability to read (and a taste
for reading), which is not the case for TV or radio. The latter relates to technological or regulatory
features that aect the level of choice that is available to media audiences { while there are hundreds of
newspapers, dozens of cable TV channels, and a virtual innity of websites with very distinct contents,
broadcast TV or network radio had only a handful of channels that were highly homogeneous. A new
media technology will thus mean that a new environment will be introduced that might contrast with
the environment that characterized the prevailing media substrate.
These dimensions of barriers and variety will interact with individual characteristics that are crucial
to their political behavior: motivation and ideology. Starting from the premises that exposure to political
information aects the levels of political motivation, and that exposure to politically and/or ideologically
charged content aects individual views and attitudes, changes in media environment that transform
either type of exposure will in turn aect political behavior. Politicians and parties will follow suit.
We put this basic intuition to work in a framework that starts with a model of how media environments
interact with individuals' ideological views and attitudes { where individuals, who start with a given
ideological position, are inuenced by what they see in the media, but can also choose which combination
of available views to watch or read. (This model delivers testable predictions on the demand for ideological
variety { e.g. that moderates are more likely to simultaneously consume content from sources with
dierent ideological varieties { for which we nd empirical support.) We then embed this into a model
of electoral competition in a majoritarian, \winner-take-all" system, with endogenous turnout. In this
model, two oce- and ideology-motivated parties adopt (one-dimensional) platforms while taking into
account individuals' views and turnout decisions, driven by intrinsic motivation and by the relative
positions of the platforms. We rst characterize how the individuals' media choices are aected by the
variety that is available in the media environment, and then characterize the political equilibrium in
terms of platforms and turnout, as a function of the media-conditioned distribution of motivation and
ideology.
With those characterizations at hand, we then show how changes in media environment aect the
political equilibrium. Our results distinguish between two separate channels: the variety eect and the
composition eect. The variety eect refers to the impact of those changes on individuals' ideological
positions: the introduction of a media environment with lower variety, such as when broadcast TV is
introduced into a substrate where newspapers or local radio are dominant, will engender a compression
2in the distribution of those positions, and parties will naturally react by moving their platforms in a
more moderate direction. In other words, less variety induces lower polarization. The composition eect,
on the other hand, refers to changes in access barriers: if a media environment with lower barriers is
introduced, such as when TV or radio are introduced into a substrate where newspapers were dominant,
then a larger number of individuals will be motivated to vote. The basic intuition implies that, because
those who did not vote before are disproportionately likely to be moderate (which is not assumed in our
model, but rather emerges endogenously from the assumption that voters are more likely to turn out
when they perceive the dierences between candidates to be large), it follows that most of these new
voters will be relatively moderate. This will provide parties with an incentive to moderate as well. In
other words, lower barriers reduce polarization, even if individual views are left unaected by exposure
to a new media environment.4
The model also provides us with a strategy to distinguish between the two eects. The theory suggests
an intimate connection between polarization and turnout, which is evident in the case of the composition
eect, where a change in turnout is the driving force behind the change in polarization. The connection
is also present in the opposite direction, again because voters care about how dierent the candidates are:
lower polarization will tend to reduce turnout. In light of that, the drop in polarization driven by the
variety eect is accompanied by a reduction in turnout, whereas that which is driven by the composition
eect is associated with increased turnout.
We then take the framework's predictions to the data. The theory in principle applies to any change in
media technology, but an ideal context to test it is the introduction of radio, in the 1920s and 1930s, and
broadcast TV, in the 1940s and 1950s, in the US. These were massive changes in media technology, and
they coincided with a period over which there was a very substantial drop in measured polarization. For
the case of TV, which we argue constituted a low-barrier, low-variety medium, we follow an empirical
strategy inspired by Gentzkow (2006), and show evidence that counties that got TV relatively early
displayed a decrease in polarization as measured by their representatives' ideological position, when
compared to latecoming counties. This result is robust to a variety of specications, and is consistent
with the empirical prediction that TV would reduce polarization. We also show that the eect on turnout
was substantially dierent depending on the media substrate. Specically, in those counties where radio
penetration had been small (and hence where TV represented a more important lowering of access
barriers), turnout increased { consistent with the logic of the composition eect { whereas counties with
a strong radio presence saw a decrease in turnout { consistent with the variety eect. Finally, we show
that the drop in polarization is quantitatively less important in relatively poorer, less educated places
{ exactly where one would expect the lowering of barriers to have had a greater impact. This suggests
4We also show that this result is reversed in the case of a proportional representation system. This is because, lying
beneath the basic intuition, there is a second eect, whereby having fewer low-motivation citizens means that parties have
to worry less about the extensive margin of getting them to turn out, and thus have more leeway to move towards their
preferred platforms. This second eect, which tends to increase polarization, is dominated in a majoritarian system, but
turns out to prevail under proportional representation.
3that the drop in polarization was driven mostly by the variety eect.
The case of radio does not provide us with as clean a strategy as for TV, but its history gives rise to
some interesting evidence for our theory. In particular, while radio was certainly a low-barrier medium,
with respect to variety there was interesting variation, as the increasing share of network-aliated sta-
tions provides a contrast of a lower-variety environment encroaching the high-variety substrate of local
radio and newspapers. The data show a negative correlation between radio exposure and polarization {
consistent with both of our eects { but they also show that this correlation was present only for exposure
to network-aliated stations. This again seems to suggest a predominance of the variety eect, since
composition would predict no dierence between aliated and unaliated stations.
In sum, we have robust evidence that TV and radio contributed to reductions in polarization. We
also have evidence that this contribution operated mostly through their direct eect on ideological views.
All in all, this suggests that the substantial reduction in polarization that occurred in the US around the
mid-20th century was helped by those changes in media environment (as had been argued for instance by
Prior (2007)) { not necessarily as the ultimate causes of this reduction, but rather likely as propagation
mechanisms amplifying changes originated from other societal shifts.
Our paper relates directly to the growing literature that has examined the interaction between media
and politics. It builds on Prior (2007), who has posited that changes in media technology have been an
important determinant of changes in polarization. His intuition is related to our composition eect: he
argues that media aects polarization because dierent levels of choice aorded by dierent technologies
would dierentially aect the turnout of individuals according to their intrinsic level of political moti-
vation (which is in turn correlated with their ideological position).5 However, he does not develop a
formal model, and ours reveals that this intuition is incomplete. In fact, the results require assumptions
on the institutional details that condition the incentives faced by politicians: it holds true under a ma-
joritarian system, which is our benchmark in light of our empirical context, but not under proportional
representation.
The paper also relates to the aforementioned literature that has analyzed the impact of new media
technologies on turnout; in particular, our auxiliary results on turnout are consistent with, and also extend
in new directions, the ndings of Gentzkow (2006), who found a negative eect of TV on turnout, and
Stromberg (2004), who found a positive eect of radio on turnout. We are also directly connected with
the (also aforementioned) literature that shows how the media aect views and beliefs { our framework
provides a missing link in that it enables us to think coherently about how media jointly aects these
views and beliefs along with turnout, and how polarization is aected as a result.
The model we propose relates to the growing literature on persuasion and media markets that followed
5Prior (2007) focuses on the choice between news content and entertainment content { as distinct from that between
dierent ideological views { and argues for the assumption that individuals who prefer news content (who are, of course,
more politically motivated) tend to be ideologically less moderate. We believe, as argued above, that the separation between
news and entertainment content is not as important, particularly when we consider the eect of media on individual views,
which he leaves aside.
4Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005). A central theme in this literature is to assess the extent to which
consumer preferences (e.g. the extent to which they care about learning the truth versus conrming
their prior views) and the degree of market competition aect the extent of media bias supplied by
one or more market competitors.6 In contrast to this literature, our model provides a simple economic
framework to assess the inuence of market variety and access barriers on consumers' political attitudes
and ideologies. By focusing on the ideological inuence of the media rather than the truthfulness of
informational content, we explore a complementary dimension that we think is important to the study of
the cultural and political impact of the media over time.7 Importantly, our model of ideological inuence
can be then used to organize the impact of the media on political outcomes such polarization and turnout.
Finally, the electoral model we study is in turn related to Glaeser et al. (2006), where oce-motivated
candidates may strategically choose to polarize, especially if they can target more extreme voters, who are
more likely to turn out. In our model, in contrast, polarization is the result of a party ideological motive,
as in Alesina and Rosenthal (1995), but we focus on how ideologies and political motivation are aected
by changes in the media environment, thus changing the incentives to polarize faced by candidates.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lays out the model of how media
environment interacts with individual views and attitudes. Section 3 embeds this model into a model of
electoral competition, showing how changes in media technology translate into changes in polarization in
the political equilibrium. Section 4 tests the predictions of the theory in the context of the introduction
of broadcast TV and radio in the US. Section 5 concludes and points at future research directions.
2 Media Environment and Citizens' Attitudes
A media environment refers to the complex array of technological, cultural, legal, market, and socioe-
conomic variables that determine the type of media and the content that are available and consumed
by individuals in a particular time and location. In this section we introduce a formal denition of
a media environment that focuses on two specic dimensions: the barriers to media access faced by
citizens/consumers, and the ideological variety of content available in the media market. While this
denition entails some heroic simplications, our hope is that they allow us to distill some of the main
empirical facts on the impact of media on political behavior. Towards this end, we provide a simple
model that aims to capture how dierent media environments aect political motivation and ideological
preferences. These predictions will then serve as input for the model of electoral competition presented
in the sequel.
6Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008) and Della Vigna and Gentzkow (2009) provide excellent surveys.
7In this sense, our paper is in the spirit of Murphy and Shleifer (2004), who provide a model in which individual views
are partly shaped by the drive to conform to the \average views" of the people they interact with. In our model, views
are inuenced by the endogenous choice of media content consumers make. This choice is in turn driven by minimizing
dissonance with their pre-existing views, as in Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005).
52.1 Media Environment and Citizens' Heterogeneity
We focus on two sources of heterogeneity across individuals (citizens): their propensity to engage in
political activities (political motivation) and their ideological views and attitudes (ideology). We hold
the view that the media can inuence both of these characteristics over time. On the latter, we think of
a citizen's ideology as her preferred position in a unidimensional (liberal-conservative) scale. The space
of ideologies is denoted by X and it is assumed to be a subset of R. With regard to political motivation,
our denition is operational: we identify motivation with a composite of individual characteristics that
are independent of ideology and aect her willingness to vote. In practice, we can think of variation in
political motivation as dierences in the cost or benet of voting that may arise from cognitive skills
(e.g. processing political information) or tastes (e.g. interest in politics, civic duty, opportunity cost of
voting). We denote the space of possible levels of political motivation as , which can be any ordered
space.
We thus assume that each voter v is characterized by a pair (xv;v) where xv 2 X is a preferred
ideology and v 2  is political motivation. Ideology and political motivation are assumed to be inde-
pendently distributed.8 The p.d.f of citizens on  is denoted by f, while the distribution of citizens'
ideology is denoted by g with an associated c.d.f. G. For simplicity, we consider political motivation to
be a binary variable { i.e.  = f;g where  < . The fraction of citizens with high motivation () is
denoted by p, and the fraction with low motivation () is 1   p.
There are at least two independent channels through which the media can inuence voters' behavior.
First, to the extent that the media carry politically relevant content, increased exposure to the media
increases an individual's political learning, which can trigger or increase political participation.9 Access
to the media is in turn aected by regulatory and technological features, which we call \barriers" to
access. For instance, conditional on a medium being geographically available at a given location, all else
equal, there is substantial variation in the cognitive requirements each medium imposes on consumers.
Reading a newspaper presumes a certain degree of literacy, perhaps a taste for reading and a non-trivial
ability to comprehend a text. In contrast, watching TV and listening to the radio seems to be associated
with lower cognitive requirements.10 We assume that each media environment is associated with an
access barrier b. We think of this as a number, and the set of access barriers is denoted by B.
The second type of media inuence we are interested in is the potential eect on citizens' political
and ideological views and attitudes. We assume that each media outlet oers content with a certain
8As shown later, the fact that political motivation is independent of ideology does not imply that the willingness to vote
of a citizen is independent of her ideology in equilibrium.
9There is considerable evidence consistent the idea that higher levels of political learning are associated with greater
participation. Potential reasons include a reduction in the uncertainty about the platforms and individual qualities of
politicians, a reduction in the cognitive costs associated to the choice of a political option, and/or increased awareness about
politics leading to a heightened sense of duty.
10On this see the references in Prior (2007, p. 72-73). While in the context of the US illiteracy (strictly speaking) would
not be of much importance, functional illiteracy is: those who \eschew any serious reading that is not imperative" could be
\estimated`to be [as much] as 60 per cent" of the population. (Converse 1962, p. 592)
6ideological \slant" or \editorial line". Our focus is not so much on the informational content and how
the \truth" viewers are presumably seeking may or may not be distorted by a particular outlet. It
is rather on the ideological content that may be explicit or implicit in media content. This is not to
say that direct informational content is not a crucial dimension of the market for news, for example.11
However, the media provide consumers with volumes of content that is hardly ideologically neutral and
that oftentimes conveys little or no direct information.12 Anecdotal evidence and introspection suggests
that, beyond information, the impact of the media on societal attitudes and values can be substantial,
as has been shown by a growing literature on the causal eect of the media on attitudes.13
Our aim is to provide a framework that allows us to describe this impact as a function of characteristics
of the market structure. In particular, we assume that each media outlet can be identied with an
ideological position m 2 X: The set of ideological positions supplied in the market, which we refer to as
the market variety, is denoted by M, M  X. Note that, unless providers are completely dierentiated
in the ideological dimension, the number of positions supplied in the market is less than the number of
content providers.14
We are now ready to provide a formal denition of a media environment:
Denition 1 A local media environment is pair E = (b;M) 2 B  2X where b 2 B is an access barrier
and M  X is the market's ideological variety.
We postulate that the distributions of voter characteristics are aected by the media environment.
Formally, let us consider a change in media technology, in which an existing media environment, which
we call a media substrate and denote with a subscript s, is being replaced by a new environment, denoted
with a subscript n. Let fb denote the distribution of political motivation for a market with barriers b.
We assume that, if barriers to access are lowered from bs to bn < bs, then the distribution fn associated
with the new environment rst order stochastically dominates the distribution fs corresponding to the
substrate. If  = f;g, this translates simply into pn > ps: an environment with lower barriers to
access entails a greater share of citizens with high levels of political motivation.
The relationship between market variety M and citizens' ideological preferences is not as obvious. In
particular, citizens can choose to consume more than one ideological variety if available. Even if a citizen
11See Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008) for interesting discussion on the role of market competition, regulation and truthful
reporting in the market for news.
12As an illustration, in recent years, echoing the political debate, a number of primetime TV dramas have provided us
with positive or negative portrayals of topics such as the rights of homosexuals to raise a family, the issues surrounding
civil liberties and the \war on terror", to mention a few examples. The same is true for a wide variety of entertainment (as
opposed to news) content, from movies and soap operas to sports features.
13Recent work includes Jensen and Oster (2009) and La Ferrara et al. (2009). These papers show the powerful impact
of TV entertainment content on individual attitudes towards fertility control and women's role in the labor market. While
entertainment oers information content (e.g. social learning) we think this evidence points to the broader cultural impact
of TV and the arts, aecting values and attitudes beyond providing information or improving accuracy.
14Importantly, as shown by Groseclose and Milyo (2005) and Gentzkow and Shapiro (2009), the market ideological variety
can be measured with considerable precision, at least for some types of media. In any event, even in the absence of a precise
measurement, one can still make qualitative inferences about changes in variety associated to the introduction of a new
media.
7consumes a single variety, which one does she choose? How do these choices translate into their views?
We provide a simple model to answer these questions.
2.2 Demand For Ideological Content
In practice, individuals choose the mix of media they consume. In principle, each media outlet in a
given media market can be conceived as a bundle that oers entertainment, information, and ideological
content, but a complete theory of media consumption is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, our
focus is to provide a simple theory of how an individual's demand for ideological content determines that
choice. This model will be an input into our theory of media and polarization, but will turn out to have
independent interest as well.
The consumption of media content requires deploying time and nancial resources. We capture this in
a simplied manner by assuming that an individual has a xed budget to be spent on media consumption.
To x ideas, we can think of this budget as an amount of time to be allocated to dierent providers {
\channels", \stations", \newspapers", \blogs". Each citizen-consumer has a xed time budget of 1, and
decides the time of exposure to each media outlet.15
We assume that each outlet diers exclusively on the ideological content it provides. We can thus
think of the citizen's allocation problem as dened over each of the ideological positions oered in the
market, the set of which we have dened as M. Let (M) be the set of probability distributions on
M. We denote by v 2 (M) the vector describing the exposure times chosen by consumer v. If
M = fm1;:::;mNg has N points then v = (v1;:::;vN) such that vj  0 and
PN
j=1 vj = 1.16 We refer
to v as consumer v's demand for ideological content.
We assume that exposure to a particular ideological content aects a citizen's preferred ideology. If
the citizen has an initial ideology zv, her \ex-post" ideology following media exposure is denoted by xv.
We assume that xv is a function of zv and the demand for ideological varieties v, i.e, xv = H(zv;v).
The map H : X  (X) ! X is referred to as an inuence function, the properties of which we dene
as follows. (Note that for any m 2 X we use m 2 (X) to denote a mass point on m.)
Assumption (A1) There exists a continuous inuence function H : X  (X) ! X such that the
ex-post ideology x for a citizen with (ex-ante) ideology z 2 X and exposure to content  2 (X)
15The assumption of a budget of size one is immaterial, but the fact that it is set exogenously, which in particular leaves
aside the extensive margin of whether to consume media content at all, is more consequential: one could assume that the size
could depend on ideology, say with more extreme individuals dropping out of media consumption. Having said that, there
are a number of factual considerations that make it a plausible approximation for the applications we focus on. First, in the
case of radio and television the relevant factors that determined the amount of resources devoted to consumption could be
primarily determined by the entertainment and information value of these broadcasts, rather than ideological considerations.
Indeed, as emphasized by Downs (1957) the political inuence of the media could easily result from of the involuntary and
passive absorption of information and views while seeking entertainment. In this line, our model is consistent with a market
in which each media option is relatively homogeneous with respect to entertainment value but possibly dierentiated with
respect to ideology. Second, if the segments who opt out for ideological reasons are a relatively small share of the population,
our setup is a close approximation.
16In a more general case, each station would be characterized by a multidimensional bundle of characteristics that include
potentially dierentiated entertainment varieties, ideological slant, information values, etc.
8is given by x = H(z;). The function H satises the following properties:
(H1) H(z;) is increasing in z;
(H2) H(z;m)   m has the same sign as z   m (In particular, H(z;z) = z);
(H3) For any m 2 X,  2 (X),  2 [0;1], if  = m + (1   ), jH(z;)   mj is decreasing in .
Condition (H1) just says that, given the same pattern of media exposure, the ex-post ideology of
an individual moves with her ex-ante ideological position. The idea is that, if a right-wing citizen and
a left-wing citizen are both exposed to the same content, the ex-post view of the left-winger will be to
the left of that of the right-winger. Conditions (H2) and (H3) capture the idea that more exposure to a
particular view pushes a citizen towards that view.17
We provide an example that illustrates how the ex-post position can be thought of as a weighted
average between a prior (or \natural" ideology) and media inuence.
Example 1 A family of inuence functions satisfying the above properties is described by
H(z;) = z +
N X
i=1
h(jz   mij;i)(mi   z)
where h(;) measures the inuence of a specic ideological content as a function of its distance to the
consumer's initial ideology and the time of exposure, and satises
PN
i=1 h(jz   mij;i) = 1 for all z;;
and M.
A special case is h(z;i) = ai, a < 1, which yields
H(z;) = (1   a)z + am(); (1)
where m() =
PN
i=1 imi is the time exposure-weighted average of the ideologies to which the consumer
is exposed. The formula above can be obtained as an approximation for a general inuence function for
the case in which the consumer is exposed to a single ideology.18
In the spirit of Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), we assume that the consumer chooses the demand for
varieties  \as if" she minimizes the dissonance between her prior ideology z and her posterior ideology
x = H(z;). The disutility of dissonance is measured by a loss function (jz   H(z;)j), where  is
17This seems like a reasonable benchmark, but it is not entirely obvious. For example, conrmatory bias and motivated
reasoning may lead an individual to drift further apart from views that are dissonant with her prior view. Note also that
there is a strong parallel between the assumptions above and the properties of Bayesian updating. Specically, the mean of
a posterior distribution is monotonic in the value of the mean of the prior, it coincides with the mean of the prior if all the
signals observed have that particular value, and it is closer to a given value of a signal the larger the number of signals of
that particular value. However, it is not at all obvious that the update in ideological views is a perfect parallel of information
processing. For example, interrupting exposure to the media might be associated with changes in ideology: the agent could
revert to prior views. This is plausible if prior experiences { sampling from memories { aect current attitudes.
18Indeed, if  = m for some m and observing that any H(;) respecting (A1) satises H(m;m) = m, we have that the
rst-order Taylor approximation yields H(z;m)  (1   a)z + am where 1   a =
@H
@z (m;m).
9strictly increasing and continuous. We also allow for the the possibility of costs associated to \switching"
between dierent media, captured by a cost function ().19 In sum, the demand (z;;M) for content
of a consumer with ex-ante ideology z in a market with variety M solves
max
 W(z;)   (jz   H(z;)j)   ():
We focus on the simple case in which there is a xed cost of switching. This allows us to illustrate
the main issues at hand, and to easily explain the more general case. Formally, we assume that () = 0
if  = m for some m 2 M and () =  otherwise.
Before fully characterizing the demand for content, let us introduce some terminology. The ideology
span (M)  X of a market with variety M is the subset of ideologies that are covered by the the
ideological variety of the market. Formally, (M) = fz 2 Xj m  z  m0 for some m;m0 2 Mg. In
particular, if M = fmg then (M) = fmg; if M contains extreme ideologies then (M) = X. We use
m(z) 2 M to denote the ideological position closest to ideology z, i.e., m(z) = argminm2M jm zj. We
can now state the following proposition, characterizing the individual demand for ideological content:
Proposition 1 Let (z;;M) be the demand for ideological content for a citizen of ideology z and
switching cost  in a market with variety M. There exists a positive, monotonically decreasing and
bounded function K : R+ ! R+ such that
(i) If  < K(jz   m(z)j) and z 2 (M) then (z;;M) is such that H(z;(z;;M)) = z.
(ii) Otherwise, if z = 2 I(M) or  > K(jz   m(z)j) then (z;;M) = m(z):
(iii) The ex-post ideology H(z;(z;;M)) is strictly increasing in the ex-ante ideology z.
This result is very intuitive, and follows from the simple observation that if the xed cost  is small
enough, it has no eect in the decision. In contrast, if this cost exceeds a threshold, the consumer will
choose a single media position. Part (i) implies that if the cost is suciently small (e.g.   0) then a
consumer with an ideology in the ideology span of the market demands a content mix that counteracts
any ideological inuence. This \conscientious" exposure (to adapt Mullainathan and Shleifer's (2005)
terminology), that counterbalances opposing ideological messages, is more valuable for citizens whose
prior views are further away from the closest position supplied by the market. Part (ii) says that citizens
with relatively \extreme" views (in the sense that they are not in the ideology span of the market), or
19There are several potential sources of switching costs. First, if the entertainment or information value across providers is
similar, habituation to a particular provider (e.g. a voice, a face, an image, style) can increase the cost of switching. Second,
while we do not model this explicitly, in media markets where pricing to consumers is relevant (e.g. cable TV, newspapers
and magazines) it is often the case that subscribers pay lower prices than non-subscribers for the same content. Finally,
switching a channel, station, or blog, requires some eort. This cost seems negligible with a remote control or the Internet,
but it need not be so for the early days of TV or radio. Thus,  can be associated to individual, market, or technological
factors.
10those whose ideology is suciently close to an ideology supplied by the market (and are thus not willing
to pay the switching cost required by mixing), will not diversify their ideological consumption { they will
rather pick the one outlet that is closest to their original view. As will be seen shortly, part (iii), which
comes directly from Condition (H1), will be instrumental in deriving the properties of the distribution
of citizens' views as a function of M and the distribution of prior views.
A basic message of the proposition is that, if the costs of switching are small, consumers can signi-
cantly neutralize the media's ideological inuence by suitably choosing exposure. Because of that, only
those with relatively extreme views, as dened above, will be signicantly aected. Indeed, if   0 and
(M) = X then H(z;(z;;M)) = z for all z. This can be interpreted as a generalized \echo chamber"
eect: after exposure consumers' views remain unchanged either because they consume a single variety
that matches their pre-existing view, or else, because they can combine exposure to ideological messages
that balance each other out.
Proposition 1 has direct testable implications on patterns of media consumption as a function of
individual ideology. To x ideas suppose that the market has two suppliers, 1 and 2, respectively
supplying positions m1 and m2, where m1 < m2. Suppose that the span is \balanced" in the sense
that the span (M) = [m1;m2] contains the moderates (as will be dened more formally below). For
a low enough , our result implies that, all else equal, moderates are more likely to be conscientious
viewers, in the sense of consuming both m1 and m2, than extremists are.
As it turns out, there is direct suggestive evidence in favor of this implication. Using data from the
Pew Research Center (2008), we can run a regression where the dependent variable is the likelihood
that an individual (conditional on watching cable news channels) will watch both Fox News Channel and
MSNBC, which are widely perceived to be the most conservative and most liberal of the three major cable
news outlets (Hamilton 2004). Our RHS variable of interest is the degree of self-described ideological
extremism, and Table A1 in the Appendix reveals a negative impact of that measure, signicant at the
10% level. In other words, moderates do seem more likely to simultaneously watch sources across the
spectrum.20
The model also predicts that, if both suppliers move in the same direction, say to the right, then
conscientious consumers will adjust their consumption, substituting away from 2 (the more right-wing
source) and consuming more from supplier 1 (the relatively left-wing option) to counteract the market
shift to the right. This is precisely what Durante and Knight (2009) nd for the case of Italy, where a
change in government shifted (relatively left-wing) public television coverage to the right, and right-wing
viewers reacted by consuming more public TV news. In sum, there seems to be evidence in favor of both
central predictions of our simple framework.
20This is consistent with the nding that strong partisans tend to segregate into dierent news sources, as documented
by Pfau et al. (2007).
112.3 Market Variety and the Distribution of Ideologies
With this simple model of individual behavior at hand, we can turn to the eects that changes in the
supply of dierent ideologies in the market will have on the distribution of individual views and attitudes.
From Proposition 1(iii), the ex-post view H(z;(z;;M)) is strictly increasing in the ex-ante view z,
and is thus invertible (and dierentiable almost everywhere). For a xed H, let RM; : X ! X denote
this inverse function.21 Let G0 be the c.d.f. of citizens' prior ideologies (i.e. in the absence of exposure
to the new media environment) and g0 for the corresponding density. Note that the c.d.f. of ex-post
ideologies for market with variety M (with switching costs given by ) is
GM;(x) = G0(RM;(x)): (2)
Our next goal is to characterize how this distribution depends on M. Intuitively, we might expect
that decreases in variety may lead to a \compression" of ideological preferences, as per the logic of
the \mainstreaming" eect that we have alluded to. To make this precise we introduce the following
denition, which is reminiscent of a mean-preserving spread.22
Denition 2 Let G and e G be two unimodal distributions on X with the same median b x. We say e G
is a compression of G if e G(x)  G(x) for all x < b x and e G(x)  G(x) for all x > b x. If the opposite
inequalities hold, e G is a dispersion of G
The main question is whether we would conrm the intuition of a monotonicity property, namely
that greater variety in the media environment always induces greater dispersion in the distribution of
ideologies. In light of our empirical application, where both for radio and TV we can assume that
switching costs are relatively minor, we will now focus on the case where  = 0.23 (With some abuse of
notation we omit  and write GM(x) for GM;(x).) For future reference, we state:
Assumption (A2)  = 0.
We will also focus our attention on symmetric (balanced) cases, by which we mean that the set of
ideologies that is covered by media environments is symmetric around the median ideology. In other
words, the most extreme ideological positions in oer are equally distant from the median individual in
the initial distribution of views. To make this precise, let us use  (M) and +(M) to designate the
two extremes of the ideology span of M, i.e., (M) = [ (M);+(M)]. We can thus dene a balanced
media environment as:
21RM;(x) has a simple interpretation: it is the prior ideology that would be mapped into x following an endogenously
chosen exposure pattern to media content if the market variety is M and the switching cost is .
22A mean-preserving spread is equivalent to a single-crossing property of the distributions such as the ones in this denition,
plus a mean preservation condition.
23The general case of  > 0 is trickier, and we give it a more complete treatment in the Appendix. Broadly speaking, our
results go through when the switching costs are suciently small.
12Denition 3 (Balanced Media Environment) A media environment with variety M is said to be balanced
with respect to the unimodal distribution G0 if the two extremes  (M) and +(M) of the ideology span
of M are symmetrically positioned relative the the median ideology b x of G0 or j (M) b xj = j+(M) b xj.
Under assumption (A2), from Proposition 1(i), the distribution GM(x) depends on M solely through
the ideology span (M). As a result, we can dene an increase (or decrease) in variety very simply as:24
Denition 4 (Increase in Variety) A market with variety M0 is said to be a decrease in variety with
respect to M if (M0)  (M0). Conversely, M is an increase in variety with respect to M0.
We can nally show that a decrease in variety for this class of distributions is associated with a
compression of the citizens' ideological preferences:
Proposition 2 Suppose assumptions (A1)-(A2) hold. If M and M0 are two markets balanced with respect
to the distribution G0, and M0 is a decrease in variety with respect to M then GM0 is a compression of
GM.
This proposition synthesizes our main intuition: if a new media environment is introduced that
comprises a narrower set of varieties available to consumers in comparison to the media substrate, then
one will observe a compression of citizens' ideological views in response to that introduction. In other
words, less variety induces mainstreaming, and more variety induces dispersion of views.
3 Media and Polarization in a Model of Electoral Competition
What are the consequences of the role of the media, as described in the model from the previous section,
for the political equilibrium? We can answer this question in the context of a relatively standard model
of electoral competition model with endogenous turnout. For simplicity, let us consider two parties, Left
(L) and Right (R). The candidates of each party choose platforms before the elections, xL and xR, along
our unidimensional ideology space X. In line with our empirical application, we think of candidates as
the Democrat and Republican contenders for a seat in the House of Representatives. Their ideologies
are interpreted as a position in the liberal-conservative dimension, in the spirit of the ideology scores
that can be calculated for representatives (i.e. winning candidates), based on their roll-call votes in the
legislature. (This is exactly what we will use in our empirical implementation, as we will discuss in detail
later.)
We start by describing each citizen's electoral behavior as a function of the prole x = (xL;xR)
of candidates' ideologies and their own individual characteristics { ideology and political motivation.
Next, we describe the electoral game between the two candidates. Our main results will make use of the
24This statement denes a complete order in the subset of distributions that are balanced with respect to a distribution
G0.
13microfoundations provided in the previous section to characterize the eects of introducing a new media
environment on the equilibrium levels of polarization jxR   xLj and turnout.
3.1 Voters
There is a continuum of citizens and a typical citizen is indexed by v: As previously argued, each citizen
v is characterized by a pair (v;xv) where v 2  represents v's level of political motivation and xv 2 X
is her preferred ideology. Citizens make two decisions: whether or not to turn out and, conditional on
turning out, whether to vote for L or R.
As is standard in the literature, we assume that the voter's utility when it comes to ideology y 2 X
decreases with the distance to her own preferred ideology. For simplicity, we assume that utility is
quadratic, i.e., uv(y) =  (y   xv)2. In particular, this means that, conditional on voting, v chooses the
candidate with the ideology closest to xv. For ease of notation, let x1=2  xL+xR
2 , so that voter v chooses
L over R if xv < x1=2 and R over L if the opposite strict inequality holds. A voter who is indierent
between both (xv = x1=2) is assumed to randomize between both choices with equal probability.25
We consider three standard motives behind the turnout decision: alienation, the consumption benet
of voting, and political motivation.26 Alienation refers to the idea that citizens are more likely to turn
out the closer is their preferred ideology to the one supported by their preferred candidate. Conversely, a
voter is alienated and abstains if this distance is too large. Formally, the likelihood that v votes increases
with Av(x) = maxj2fL;Rg uv(xj). The consumption benet of voting is the dierence between the utilities
associated to each of the candidates' ideologies. This is to capture the idea that individuals are more
likely to turn out if they perceive the stakes of the election to be high. For voter v, this is measured by
Dv(x) = juv(xL)   uv(xR)j. Using the fact that uv() is quadratic, we can write down:
Dv(x) = 2jxR   xLj

x1=2   xv

:
Hence, for any xv, changes in the candidates' ideological positions that increase polarization jxR   xLj,
while keeping the average ideology x1=2 constant, will increase the consumption motive Dv(x). On the
other hand, for any xed level of polarization jxR   xLj between the parties, Dv(x) is larger for voter's
with more extreme bliss points as we pull away from median ideology. Both the alienation and consump-
tion motives depend on the prole of candidates platforms. The third motive, an individual's political
motivation, is { by assumption { independent of platforms and captured by a \vertical" parameter v.
As discussed earlier, there are a number of vertical factors that can inuence a voter's willingness to
vote including the extent to which the individual cares about politics, his sense of civic duty, and the
opportunity cost of voting.
25This assumption is essentially irrelevant, as the p.d.f. g is assumed to be absolutely continuous and hence this set has
measure zero.
26Note that we assume that voters are innitesimal, with a negligible probability of being pivotal. Their motivation is
not instrumental. For more on this see Riker and Odershook (1968), Aldrich (1993), Glaeser et al. (2005).
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Figure 1: Ideology, Motivation and Turnout in a Model with Alienation
In sum, given x, the utility of voting for citizen v is given by U(x;v;xv) = q(Av(x);Dv(x);v) where
q : R2   ! R is a function decreasing in its rst argument (alienation), and increasing in its second
and third arguments (consumption and motivation). Without loss of generality, the utility of abstention
is normalized to zero. It follows that a citizen votes if
U(x;v;xv)  0:
For a xed prole of ideologies x, the above inequality denes a turnout region in the (;x)-space of
voter characteristics. The following assumption, allows for an explicit characterization of this region.
Assumption (P1) q is additively separable, i.e. the utility of turnout is given by
U(x;v;xv) =  Av(x) + Dv(x) + v:
Figure 1 shows the turnout region for a generic case satisfying Assumption (P1). It is composed by
two symmetric regions, one corresponding to \L voters" who prefer L to R, and the other corresponding
to \R voters" who prefer R to L. For each xed level of political motivation , there are two types of
citizens who abstain from voting: extreme voters who nd themselves alienated, and those who have low
enough political motivation and are relatively moderate (so that the consumption benet of voting is
relatively small). Figure 2 shows the region for the special case in which  = 0 (no alienation motive).
In this case, extremists always vote as the consumption motive is larger for them, and those who abstain
are moderates with low political motivation levels.
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Figure 2: Ideology, Motivation and Turnout in a Model without Alienation
For ease of exposition, in what follows we make two simplifying assumptions. First, we focus on the
case in which turnout is determined exclusively by the consumption motive and political motivation, as
in Glaeser et al. (2006). As explained later, the main features of our predictions remain qualitatively
unchanged if we allow for  > 0 as long as the consumption motive is suciently strong. For future
reference, we state that as:
Assumption (P2) No alienation motive for turnout ( = 0).
Our second simplifying assumption just says that political motivation is binary. Low motivation
citizens have  =  c, where c > 0 is interpreted as a net cost of voting for those with low political
motivation. For high motivation citizens,  = d is represents the net benet of voting (e.g. civic duty).
We state that as:
Assumption (P3)  = f;g where  =  c and  = d, c;d > 0
This assumption implies that high motivation citizens vote regardless of candidate platforms. On the
other hand, as illustrated by Figure 2, if assumption (P2) holds, there exist thresholds yL(x) < x1=2 and
yR(x) > x1=2 such that all the low motivation citizens with ideologies between yL(x) and yR(x) abstain
from voting. Thus, moderate low-motivation citizens do not turn out. Voters to the left of yL(x) vote
for L while those to the right of yR(x) vote for R. If the support of the ideology distribution G is [x;x],
these thresholds are given by
yL(x) = max

x;x1=2  
c
2(xR   xL)

and yR(x) = min

x;x1=2 +
c
2(xR   xL)

:
16Note that the set of (relatively) moderate voters who abstain increases as the platforms get closer and
the consumption benet of voting drops. The following lemma derives the turnout for each party VL and
VR as a function of the prole of strategies x and the distribution of citizens characteristics.
Lemma 1 Suppose assumptions (P1) and (P2) hold. The levels of turnout for each parties and total
turnout are given by
VL(x) = pG(x1=2) + (1   p)G(yL(x));
VR(x) = p(1   G(x1=2)) + (1   p)[1   G(yR(x))]; and
V (x) = 1   (1   p)G(x);
where G(x)  G(yR(x))   G(yL(x)) is the share of low motivation citizens that do not vote:
3.2 Political Competition
Having characterized the behavior of voters, we can now turn our attention to the politicians. We assume
that candidates are both oce- and policy-motivated. Candidate j's policy motivation is represented by
a decreasing function uj(xj) of the distance between her proposed ideology xj and her preferred ideology,
which we denote by x0j 2 X, where x0L < x0R. This preferred ideology, in our context, could represent
the average ideological preference of a group of local constituencies, the national party's ideology, the
candidate's intrinsic ideological preferences, or a combination of those. For simplicity, just as with voters,
we assume that uj(xj) =  (xj   x0j)2.27
We use Wj(x) to denote candidate j's oce motivation, j 2 fL;Rg, when candidates choose the prole
x = (xj;x j), where as usual  j stands for candidate j's opponent. As it turns out, the qualitative nature
of some of our results, as anticipated, will depend on the ner details of this motivation term. For our
benchmark, we consider the case that is most descriptive of our empirical application, which focuses on
legislative elections in the United States. For each congressional district, these are majoritarian, \winner-
take-all" contests, so we assume as our benchmark that candidates care about winning the election. For
simplicity, we operationalize this assumption as Wj(x) = Vj(x)   V j(x), namely the margin of victory
for candidate j 2 fL;Rg.28 In contrast, in a proportional system it might be more natural to assume
27Most models of electoral competition with policy motivations consider candidates who care about the distance between
their preferred ideology and the policy implemented in equilibrium rather than the policy they promote (See again, for
example, Austen-Smith and Banks (2005).) This seems plausible in the context of a presidential election, but less so in
the context of our empirical application. Indeed, if we think of candidates as contestants for a seat in the legislature, the
policies implemented will normally result from the interaction between representatives of possibly hundreds of districts. In
this context, it seems more plausible to identify the policy motive with the policies the candidates commit to support in
the legislature if elected. More broadly, as emphasized by Alesina and Rosenthal (1995), the model is consistent with the
idea that it may not be credible for political agents to depart from their preferred ideology even if they care mostly about
electoral incentives.
28The direct alternative would be to assume that each candidate receives a payo of 1 if he/she wins and 0 otherwise.
However, in a model in which candidates are perfectly informed about the distribution of voter preferences, as is our case,
it is well-known that this implies discontinuous payos as a function of the strategies, and consequent equilibrium existence
problems. (See, for example, Austen-Smith and Banks (2005, ch. 7).) In contrast, in a probabilistic voting model in which
17that maximizing the share of votes, so that Wj(x) = Vj(x)=V (x), reects more accurately the incentives
of political competitors.
In sum, we are interested in the Nash equilibria of the game in which candidates choose ideologies to
maximize the additive objective
Oj(xj;x j) = Wj(xj;x j) + uj(xj);
where  > 0 measures the importance of the policy motivation relative to the oce motivation. Our
benchmark assumption on the nature of the latter can be stated for future reference as:
Assumption (P4) (Winner-takes-all) Each candidate's oce motivation is captured by the margin of
victory Wj(x) = Vj(x)   V j(x).
We will also focus our attention in a symmetric case, in the sense that candidates are positioned
symmetrically relative to the median individual. This ensures the existence of a symmetric equilibrium
in which candidates choose equilibrium ideologies that are equidistant from the median ideology b x. We
state this assumption as:
Assumption (P5) jx0L   b xj = jx0R   b xj, where b x is the median of the distribution of ideologies G.
Let us discuss the intuition behind the electoral incentives captured by the model. Note that if p = 1,
all citizens are highly motivated and vote. In this case, if  is suciently small so that candidates care
mostly about the electoral outcome, the unique equilibrium of the game involves both parties choosing
converging ideologies, namely the median voter's preferred ideology b x. If p is small, on the other hand,
in order to attract low-motivation voters to the polls, parties may face an incentive to choose policies
that are more extreme. Still, the parties also face the convergence force driven by the incentive to steal
voters from their competitor. It can be shown that for most reasonable distributions the convergence
incentives prevail if  is small.29 Hence, in our model, ideological polarization exists in equilibrium only
if  is high enough, which is what we state precisely in:
Assumption (P6) g(b x) < jx0R   x0Lj:
candidates are imperfectly informed about this distribution (e.g. the ideology distribution G is a symmetric unimodal
distribution, but its median is imperfectly known and distributed uniformly on a subinterval of X), the candidates' expected
payo from winning the election is simply the probability of winning the election. This is typically a continuous function
of the strategies. Furthermore, under reasonable conditions on the voters' preferences over platforms, maximizing this
probability is equivalent to maximizing the margin of victory computed for an \average distribution". Thus, an expression
analogous to Wj(x) can be derived if candidates care exclusively about winning rather than maximizing the margin of
victory in a model with probabilistic voting. (For equivalence results of this type in elections with abstention see Leydard
[1984], Coughlin [1992], and Duggan [2000].) Our specication is a reduced-form way of implementing this assumption.
29In Glaeser et al. (2005), divergence in equilibrium relies on the additional assumption that parties are able to target
their messages. In particular, a more extreme voter is more likely to be informed about how extreme a candidate's policy
really is than a moderate one.
18If p = 1 the marginal electoral benet associated with a small move towards moderation when both
candidates choose the median voter's preferred ideology b x is g(b x), while the marginal disutility of moving
away from the candidate's preferred policy is jx0R  x0Lj. The assumption ensures that each candidate
has an incentive to move towards their own preferred platform whenever both of them choose the median
voter's preferred ideology b x.
We are now ready to characterize the political equilibrium:
Lemma 2 If (P1)-(P6) hold then any symmetric equilibrium x = (x
L;x
R) of the electoral game is such
that xL0 < x
L < x
R < x0R:
This lemma shows that our assumptions guarantee the existence of a symmetric equilibrium with a
positive level of polarization, i.e. x
R  x
L > 0. At the same time, the equilibrium level of polarization is
bounded by the candidates' preferred ideologies.
3.3 Main Results: New Media and Political Outcomes
We can now establish our main results, which describe how changes in the media environment will aect
the political equilibrium of the electoral model we have just described. An equilibrium of the electoral
game x is a function of the citizens' distribution of characteristics, i.e., the distribution of political
motivation and the distribution of ideologies, G. Under our binary assumption, the former is determined
by p, the fraction of high motivation citizens. We thus write x = x(p;G).
As shown in the previous section, a media environment E = (b;M) aects the distribution of citizens'
characteristics. In particular, p is aected by accessibility barriers b, and G is aected by the market's
ideological variety M as described by proposition 2, so that p = pb and G = GM. With some abuse
of notation, we write x(E) = x(pb;GM), so as to make explicit the connection between political
outcomes and the media environment. Let x(E)  x
R(E)  x
L(E) and V   V (x(E)) designate the
corresponding levels of equilibrium polarization and turnout. We are interested in how these quantities
will change with changes in E.
Before we move on to the results, it is worth mentioning that while Lemma 2 guarantees the existence
of equilibria, uniqueness is not guaranteed.30 The comparative statics summarized by our results are
robust in the sense that they apply to the largest and smallest selection { where the smallest (resp. largest)
selection refers to the symmetric equilibrium having the smallest (resp. largest) level of polarization level.
3.3.1 The Composition Eect
Our rst prediction concerns the eect of a reduction in access barriers. A canonical example, as we
will argue, is the introduction of radio or television in a society in which the new medium replaces
30For a uniform distribution of citizens' ideologies on any interval the equilibrium is unique under assumptions (P1)-(P5).
However, this is not necessarily true for other distributions { for instance, multiple equilibria are possible for a triangle
distribution.
19newspapers as the primary source of news and entertainment. As argued in the previous section, an
increase in access will be typically associated with an increase in political learning and, more generally,
what we have referred as political motivation. In our model, this is captured by a rst-order stochastic
dominance transformation in the distribution of political motivation. (Given Assumption (P3), this can
happen either by an increase in the fraction of citizens p with high motivation , or by increasing one or
both of the motivation levels { e.g. a reduction of the cost of voting for the low motivation c). For this
case, we can state the following:
Proposition 3 Let Es = (bs;Ms) and En = (bn;Mn) be respectively the substrate and the new media
environments. Suppose that bn < bs and Mn = Ms, i.e., the new environment lowers barriers to access.
Then, if the the p.d.f. of ex-ante ideological preferences g0 is log-concave, the political equilibrium is
aected as follows:
(i) Polarization falls: x(En)  x(Es)
(ii) Turnout increases: V (En)  V (Es).
The inequalities are strict if either pn > ps or cn < cs.
The result is very intuitive, although further probing will reveal some subtleties that we will discuss
later on. To x ideas, suppose that the reduction in barriers leads to an increase in the fraction of highly
motivated citizens from ps to pn. In our model, individuals vote either because they are suciently mo-
tivated or because their preferences are relatively extreme. Indeed, the turnout decision of citizens with
low political motivation depends on the consumption benet of voting. In particular, for a xed prole
of candidate ideologies, this benet is larger for voters with extreme ideological preferences than mod-
erates. Since all high-motivation citizens vote, the distribution of preferences of high-motivation voters
is relatively more moderate than the one corresponding to low-motivation voters. Thus, ceteris paribus,
an increase in the fraction of high motivation citizens is associated with a change in the composition of
the preferences of those who turn out, increasing the share of moderates. As a result, each candidate
has an incentive to moderate their ideology to compete for the vote of the \new moderates" who join
the electorate. This leads to a drop in polarization. Because it is driven by a change in the composition
of the electorate in equilibrium, we refer to this drop in polarization associated to a reduction in access
barriers as the composition eect.31
Part (ii) seems quite natural: an increase in the share of high-motivation citizens should naturally
lead to higher turnout. However, the model reveals a subtler intuition, which is apparent from Lemma
31The logic for a decrease in the cost c of voting for low motivation citizens is similar. Note that an increase of the duty
benet of voting d for high motivation citizens is insubstantial, as all citizens in this group vote to begin with.
201. Let g = g(yR)   g(yL) and observe that yj, j 2 fL;Rg, depends on p. A small increase in p yields
dV = (G)dp + (1   p)[g(yL)dyL   g(yR)dyR]
= (G)dp + (1   p)

 gdx1=2 + (g(yR) + g(yL))
c
2(x)2d(x)

:
The rst term is the direct eect, which is always positive: since high-motivation citizens vote, increasing
their share increases turnout. This is precisely the intuition we have just mentioned. However, there is
an indirect eect which is due to the fact that candidates' platforms will react, and that this will aect
the turnout of the 1 p low-motivation citizens. This indirect eect is captured by the terms in brackets.
For a symmetric equilibrium, g = 0 so the rst term in brackets drops out. The second term in brackets
is negative, though, as equilibrium polarization drops (d(x) < 0) decreasing the consumption benet
of voting. We can show that the direct eect dominates if g0 is log-concave as we assume.32
3.3.2 The Variety Eect
We now turn our attention to the eect of changes in media variety on polarization. The assumptions
behind Proposition 2 are maintained, from which a balanced increase in variety is associated with a
compression while a balanced decrease in variety leads to a compression of the distribution of preferences.
We can thus state the following:
Proposition 4 Let Es = (bs;Ms) and En = (bn;Mn) be respectively the substrate and the new media
environments. Suppose that bs = bn and Mn is a balanced decrease in variety with respect to Ms. Then,
there exists p0 2 [0;1] such that if p  p0 and the p.d.f. of ex-ante ideological preferences g0 is log-concave,
the political equilibrium is aected as follows:
(i) Polarization falls: x(En)  x(Es)
(ii) Turnout decreases: V (En)  V (Es)
Here is the intuition for the result: as shown by Proposition 2, a balanced decrease in variety is
associated with a compression of the distribution of citizens' ideologies. This means that the marginal
electoral benet of a policy movement towards moderation is higher for the new distribution, resulting
in lower polarization.
In contrast with the composition eect, this reduction in polarization is accompanied by a decrease
in turnout. Indeed, since all high-motivation citizens always vote, the decrease in variety only aects the
turnout decision of low-motivation citizens. Formally, we can see from Lemma 1 that:
32Most of the familiar distributions are log-concave, including the uniform and the normal. (See Bagnoli and Bergstrom
(2005).) Intuitively, log-concavity means that there is sucient weight in the middle of the distribution, which is not too
\polarized". As moderates are the ones driving the increase in turnout, this ensures that the overall eect will be positive.
21dV = (1   p)[ d(G) + g(yL)dyL   g(yR)dyR]
= (1   p)

 d(G)   gdx1=2 + (g(yR) + g(yL))
c
2(x)2d(x)

:
For a compression, the mass of low-motivation citizens who abstain grows as the mass of moderates grows,
and only those with suciently extreme preferences care enough about voting. Specically, d(G) > 0
as the set of citizens with views on the symmetric interval [yL;yR] that contains b x is larger following the
compression. Hence, the direct eect is negative: an increase in the share of moderates among those with
lower motivation decreases turnout. The second term is zero for a symmetric equilibrium as g = 0 and
dx
1=2 = 0. The third term is negative as polarization falls, so d(x) < 0.
In sum, we have uncovered two channels through which changes in the media environment aect
equilibrium polarization: a decrease in barriers to access reduces polarization, because new voters brought
into the electorate are relatively moderate, and so does a decrease in variety, because the resulting
compression in citizens' ideological views increases politicians' incentives for moderation. In addition, we
have derived dierent predictions stemming from each channel when it come to the eects on turnout,
which decreases with the former and increases with the latter.
3.4 Discussion and Extensions
It is illuminating to consider what happens to our results when we modify two of our assumptions. Let
us start by lifting Assumption (P2), thus allowing for an alienation motive behind the turnout decision.
The results presented above remain true in this case. The only dierence is that, with alienation, both
moderate and extreme voters with low political motivation can abstain in equilibrium depending on the
platforms chosen by the candidates. In particular, a decrease in media variety that leads to a decrease
in polarization and turnout, as described by Proposition 4, can be associated with a drop in the vote by
both moderates and extremists. Under Assumption (P2), in contrast, it is only the former who drop out.
Most interestingly, the \winner-take-all" assumption (Assumption (P4)) is indeed crucial for some
of the results. Specically, the qualitative nature of the composition eect summarized by Proposition
3 changes if we consider a dierent oce motivation for the politicians. Let us make this precise by
considering a model with proportional representation, where the politicians' oce motivation is described
as:
Assumption (P4') (Proportional Representation) Each candidate's oce motivation is captured by
the share of votes, i.e., Wj(x) = Vj(x)=V (x).
Under this assumption, the composition eect on polarization is reversed.
22Proposition 5 Let Es = (bs;Ms) and En = (bn;Mn) be respectively the substrate and the new media
environments. Suppose that bn < bs and Mn = Ms, i.e., the new environment lowers barriers to ac-
cess. Then, if the cumulative distribution ex-ante ideological preferences G0 is log-concave, the political
equilibrium is aected as follows:
(i) Polarization increases: x(En)  x(Es)
(ii) Turnout increases: V (En)  V (Es).
The inequalities are strict if either pn > ps or cn < cs.
Why does proportional representation lead to an increase in polarization, reversing the conclusion
obtained for the \winner-take-all" case? As it turns out, the intuition behind the composition eect,
which seemed very natural, is in fact a little more subtle than meets the eye. The fact that the electorate
becomes more moderate as a result of the entry of previously low-motivation citizens into the voter pool
is evidently present, but there is a second eect related to the extensive margin of those citizens who
remain low-motivation. Becoming more extreme entails a cost of losing moderate low-motivation voters,
who decide to abstain instead; if there are fewer low-motivation voters, this cost is correspondingly lower.
This means that the parties will face a lower cost to moving towards their preferred ideologies (and away
from the median). In sum, a reduction in barriers to access stimulates moderation in order to chase the
intensive margin of those who decide to turn out, but it facilitates extremism because of the reduced
importance of the extensive margin.
Both of these eects were already present in the \winner-take-all" case { our previous discussion of
the intuition was deliberately simplied { but there it turns out that the moderating incentive prevails.
Proposition 5 shows that this is no longer the case under Assumption (P4').33 Why is that the case,
intuitively? Under a majoritarian system, the intensive margin is always more important than the
extensive margin, by a factor of two, because it represents an additional vote for j and one fewer vote for
33To see this from a formal perspective, note rst that Vj(x)=V (x) =
1
2 (Vj(x)   V j(x))=V (x), that is, the oce-
motivation component is proportional to the one under Assumption (P4) (margin of victory), but normalized by total votes.
The latter will increase as a result of the reduced barriers, thus working in the opposite direction of Proposition 3. To look
at the overall eect, it is useful to contrast the two extreme cases of p = 1 and p = 0. If p = 1 then all citizens turnout
(V (x) = 1 for all x) and the rst-order condition in a symmetric equilibrium is
g(b x) = (x

L   xL0).
Instead if p = 0,
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where y
+
L = b x  
c
x+ < b x. By log-concavity, the left-hand-side of the latter equation (p = 0) is greater than the one
corresponding to p = 1. In short, the equilibrium platform will be farther to the left under the former than under the latter.
23 j. Under proportional representation, in contrast, the two margins have essentially the same weight.34
Because of this greater relative weight, the eect driven by the extensive margin is more important in
the latter case, and will dominate as long as the distribution of preferences is log-concave.
The broader lesson is that the eect of changes in the media environment, when it comes to the
composition eect, will depend on institutional features. Under majoritarian systems, as we will see,
we would expect the introduction of a relatively low-barrier environment (say, radio entering a media
substrate dominated by newspapers) to lead to lower polarization. The same change in media technology
would be expected to lead to greater polarization under a proportional representation system, because
the incentives faced by politicians would dier. An empirical investigation of this prediction remains for
future research, but the prediction itself illustrates quite starkly the importance of a formal theory in
elucidating the nature of these eects.
4 Changes in Media Environment and Polarization: Empirical Evi-
dence
We can now turn to the data to assess whether our framework's predictions can illuminate the eects of
the introduction of new media technologies on political polarization. To motivate the context in which
we will pursue this, we can look at the data on polarization that is presented by McCarty et al. (2006,
p. 8) for the case of the US over the 20th century. As displayed in Figure 3, they display a remarkable
decrease in polarization (measured in this case by the distance between the two-party dierence in average
Nominate scores in the US House of Representatives) from the 1920s and into the 1960s.35 While many
societal changes beyond the introduction of media technologies lie behind this trajectory, many of which
(such as immigration) are analyzed in their book, the variation that it entails gives us hope that, in this
context, we may be able to identify eects that are quantitatively important.
As it turns out, this variation in polarization is roughly contemporaneous with two instances in
which new media technologies were adopted very fast and very broadly, which also gives us hope that
any potential eects are more easily detectable. We are obviously referring to the introduction of the
radio, in the 1920s and 1930s, and later of broadcast TV, in the 1940s and 1950s. The share of US
households with radio sets went from around zero to 80 percent in roughly 15 years, between the early
1920s and late 1930s; that same share for TV sets went a similar distance over an even shorter span
of time, between the late 1940s and late 1950s (Prior 2007, p. 13). Both media carried substantial
amounts of explicitly political content (Prior 2007, Benjamin 2001), and their eect on general attitudes
34To see this schematically, consider the eect of one additional vote for candidate j in each of the margins, under the
dierent systems, in a model with a discrete set of voters. Under Assumption (P4), an extra vote in the intensive margin
yields V (xj) + 1   (V (x j)   1), while the extensive margin yields V (xj) + 1   V (x j) { the dierence is 2 for 1. Under
Assumption (P4'), the contrast is between
V (xj)+1
V (x) and
V (xj)+1
V (x)+1 { for a dierence of
1
V (x) versus
1
V (x)+1. The factor here is
always smaller than 2, for any V (x) > 1, and approaches 1 for a large V (x).
35The fall in polarization between the 1940s and 1960s seems dwarfed by that over the two preceding decades, but was
still quite important. See McCarty, et al. (undated).
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Figure 3: US House Polarization (and Immigration), 1880-2003
and beliefs, with natural ideological and political implications, certainly went beyond that.
In sum, rapid and important change in media environments, plus substantial variation in polarization,
create an ideal context in which to test the predictions of our framework.
4.1 TV and Radio: Context and Characteristics
What should we expect these predictions to be for the episodes we focus on? For this we need to under-
stand their characteristics and the context in which they took place. Let us start with the introduction
of TV in the US, in the 1940s and 1950s.36 The impact of television was immense in terms of popularity,
which makes it an obvious candidate for identifying eects on political behavior. Particularly interest-
ing for our purposes, the early days of television were marked by low variety: \the most popular mass
medium ever oered the lowest degree of content choice of any mass medium." (Prior, 2007, p. 68) First
of all, few channels were available { an average of three stations per market in 1965. Second, even if the
average viewer had access to a few additional channels from signals traveling from other markets, these
were essentially retransmitting network programming, exposing dierent markets to very similar content.
Last but not least, both because of FCC regulation and market-driven choices, the content provided by
each network was quite similar to what was oered by the others: as put by Webster (1986, p. 79), \there
is no signicant dierence in what a viewer can see on ABC, CBS, and NBC", the three major networks
at the time. This narrow set of options, not surprisingly, tended to be restricted to middle-of-the-road,
36The discussion in the following two paragraphs largely follows information gathered from Sterling and Kittross (2002)
and Prior (2007).
25\mainstream" content.37 In sum, using the language from our theory, TV was a low-variety medium,
both within and across localities.
Just as importantly for our purposes, TV was unquestionably a highly accessible medium. It required
considerably less attention and cognitive ability than newspapers or magazines. As such, it was also much
more amenable to the kind of incidental learning that would particularly aect individuals who are not
that motivated for politics to begin with, as emphasized by Prior (2007). In addition, while it might be
the case that the price of buying a TV set would represent a signicant barrier in many contexts, the
very rapid pace at which Americans bought them upon the introduction of TV broadcasting belies this
concern in our context. In short, we can also characterize TV as a low-barrier medium.
How about radio? Similarly to the case of TV, as we have noted, the diusion of radio was also very
fast and its inuence widespread, starting in the 1920s and through the 1940s.38 It is rather clear that
radio also constituted a relatively high-accessibility alternative to the print media, the dominant media
technology of the day: it did not require literacy, nor reading skills or habit.39 In other words, radio was
a low-barrier medium.
The story is somewhat more complicated when it comes to variety, which will in fact turn out to
be useful for our empirical exercise. Initially, in the 1920s, radio was a local phenomenon, with lots of
variety in terms of content.40 Nevertheless, an interesting and somewhat unexplored aspect of the rise of
radio was the \networkization" phenomenon that occurred in the 1930s and 1940s. Starting in the late
1920s { after the creation of the rst two major networks (NBC and CBS) in 1926-27 and the Radio Act
of 1928, which favored consolidation as a way of organizing the allocation of the radio spectrum { and
picking up speed in the 1930s and 1940s, the dominant trend was the spectacular rise of the networks
that underpinned the so-called \golden age" of radio. By the late 1940s, almost all stations were aliated
to one of the four major networks, as ABC (which was spun o by NBC due to regulatory pressure)
and Mutual had joined the rst two. (The pattern is depicted in Figure 4.) While a full history of that
process is beyond the scope of the paper (Sterling and Kittross 2002), the fact is that these networks
introduced a much more homogenous content to their aliates across the country.41 This means that,
37According to Gerbner et al (1980, p. 19-20), \television does contribute to the cultivation of common perspectives.
In particular, heavy viewing may serve to cultivate beliefs of otherwise disparate and divergent groups toward a more
homogeneous \mainstream" view."
38The fact that radio was overtaken by TV soon thereafter as a mass media technology has made the study of its political
eects relatively less salient. A prominent exception is Stromberg (2004).
39Prior (2007) argues that radio audience still displayed an upper-class bias when it comes to the news, which was not the
case with TV. In any case, there is little doubt that radio was a mass medium with a much broader reach than newspapers:
by 1938, even at the lowest level of income (below $1,000 a year) 57% of households had at least one radio set (Sterling and
Kittross 2002, p. 204). Considering how radio was often a communally shared experience (Cohen 1990), this understates
the true reach of the medium.
40This is vividly described, for the particular example of Chicago, in Cohen (1990): radio stations would often cater to
specic ethnic groups, for instance.
41As Sterling and Kittross (2002, p. 284) describe, \ the national networks exercised great power over individual aliates.
In several cases, when local radio stations wanted to substitute a local program for a network program, network ocials
threatened to reconsider the station's aliation contract. (...) [S]uch threats had great eect, for network aliation was
the key to success."
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Figure 4: The Rise of Radio Networks
while radio started as a high-variety medium, it gradually moved towards lower levels of variety.
We can thus characterize the dierent media involved in the episodes to be considered in our empirical
exercise according to the stylized depiction in Figure 5.
4.2 Empirical Predictions
Figure 5 helps us interpret the transitions in media technologies in terms of the theory. Given a certain
media substrate, it lets us map out whether the introduction of the new technology represents a decrease
or increase in access barriers, and/or a balanced decrease or increase in variety with respect to that
substrate. Note that, in our context, the substrate could well vary across dierent locations: for instance,
TV could be introduced into a market with a strong radio presence (network or not), or into a market
where radio was sparse and newspapers still dominant. Note also that we are considering a context of
majoritarian elections, which means that we would describe it with Assumption (P4).
Based on that, we can spell out what are the empirical predictions we should expect to see in the
data:
Empirical Prediction 1: TV reduces polarization The introduction of TV can be interpreted as
a balanced decrease in variety, regardless of the substrate. It also represents a lowering of access barriers
{ or a non-increase, at the very least. In that case, both the variety and composition eects work in the
same direction, unambiguously reducing polarization.
Empirical Prediction 2: The eect of TV on turnout is ambiguous (depends on substrate)
While our main focus is polarization, of course, our theory also has predictions on the eects of media
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on turnout. Here, for the case of TV, the prediction is more subtle. If the dominant substrate medium
before TV happened to be radio, we would expect to see the variety eect in action { but not so much the
composition eect. This would predict lower turnout, as lower polarization demobilized voters. On the
other hand, if newspapers were dominant, one would expect to see added strength on the composition
eect: newly mobilized voters turning out would counteract the former movement.
Empirical Prediction 3: Radio reduces polarization The introduction of radio into a substrate
dominated by newspapers would represent a lowering of access barriers, and the composition eect would
thus induce lower polarization. Networkization would push in the same direction, via the variety eect.
Empirical Prediction 4: The eect of radio on turnout is ambiguous (depends on network)
As far as turnout is concerned, radio would initially increase turnout, because of the composition eect.
Network radio, on the other hand, might have a negative eect as it implies a balanced decrease in
variety.
4.3 Going to the Data: Measuring Polarization
Before taking these predictions to the data, we must rst gure out a way to measure our main variable of
interest, polarization. Our model ultimately refers to the behavior of politicians, which we assume to react
to the preferences of constituents. One set of measures of polarization of (incumbent) politicians is the
one used by McCarty et al. (2006), as exemplied above; however, since our data on media technologies
are at the county level { as will be later described in greater depth { we want a measure of polarization
28that also varies at that same level. This rules out those measures, which are dened at the national level.
We construct such a county-level measure by resorting again to the DW Nominate scores for US House
members, from Poole and Rosenthal.42 While this is a well-established measure for ideological positions
that is comparable across individuals and over time, it is available at the congressional district level,
which we then need to match with the county-level information. If one district comprises more than one
county (which is typically the case) we attribute the Nominate score of the district's representative to
all of the counties. Due to their geographic proximity, those counties will typically be part of the same
TV market (and will thus share the same date of TV introduction), but not always. In any event, we
will cluster the standard errors at the level of the congressional district - by decade, since districts are
redrawn based on every new Census. If one county is split over more than one district, we take the
Nominate score of that county to be the simple average of all the representatives associated with it. We
would like to weigh that average by the share of the county's population that belongs to each district,
but we do not have that information. Because of this limitation, we will limit the sample to the set of
single-district counties in our main specications, and consider the full set of counties for robustness.43
Once we have the scores converted onto the county level, we need to turn them into measures of
polarization. Since we only have the measure of ideological position for the incumbent, it is not possible
to observe polarization within each county. Nevertheless, within the context of our model we can proxy
for that by looking at polarization across counties.44 One way to capture this is to look at a relative
measure: the (absolute) dierence between a county's score and the average score of all counties in that
year. We call this measure \relative polarization". We can also think of a non-relative measure, which
compares the ideological score to the standard DW Nominate benchmark of zero. We thus compute the
absolute value of the county's score, and call it \absolute polarization". We think of this as a non-relative
measure in that its benchmark does not vary over time. In that sense, it captures whether a county's
preferences are moving away from the center, while the rst measure captures whether they are moving
away from other counties' preferences. These measures will be the main outcome variables of interest in
our analysis.
In addition to these two main variables, we also consider the eect of media on the behavior of voters,
which our theory suggests is the key transmission mechanism from voters' preferences to the positions
42We actually look at the rst coordinate of DW Nominate, which is usually interpreted as a conventional left-right
ideological spectrum, as distinct from the second dimension that in the US case used to capture positions with respect to
racial issues. This might be relevant for the period we are looking at, which mostly precedes the Southern realignment. We
have checked that our results survive when we leave the South out of the sample.
43Note that we have one measure per congress, i.e. two-year period.
44To see why this is the case, consider the inuence function we have described in our model, y = H(x;). For simplicity
of exposition, we can take the media content to be set at m (which is equivalent to having a single media source). If we
abuse notation to state y = H(x;m) and take a 1st order Taylor expansion of H around the point where x = m, we have
y  x + H
0(x;x)(m   x). This implies y   E[y]  (1   H
0(x;x))(x   E[x]) and y   m  (1   H
0(x;x)(x   m), and any
compression of the distribution of y around the local mean relative to the distribution of x will be matched by a relative
compression of that distribution around m. To the extent that m is anchored by the national mean, the within-county
compression is matched by an across-county compression.
29taken by politicians. The voting data comes from county-level election results compiled by ICPSR (study
#8611); from that we compute a measure of the \lopsidedness" of the election, as the (absolute) dierence
between Democratic and Republican shares of the vote. This can be another window onto polarization, to
the extent that less polarization (in the cross-county sense) would reduce the share of Republican (resp.
Democratic) vote in districts that are more Republican (resp. Democratic) than the average, thereby
making elections less lopsided. Finally, we are also interested in predictions on turnout, insofar as our
theory suggests that turnout and polarization are intimately related. We thus look at voter turnout (in
congressional elections).45
4.4 Evidence from the Introduction of Broadcast TV
We are now ready to move on to the evidence, starting with the introduction of broadcast TV. As we
have noted, the fast adoption of the new technology means that there was substantial variation over a
short period of time. It was also the case that there was substantial variation across dierent places
in terms of the timing of introduction of and the exposure to the new medium { with an additional
exogenous component to this timing was generated by events that delayed introduction in markets that
would have otherwise gotten TV earlier than they did.46 Given these features, we can implement an
empirical strategy along the lines of the one proposed by Gentzkow (2006) in his analysis of the eect of
the introduction of TV on voter turnout.47 In other words, we combine the use of a panel structure that
controls for constant unobservable factors and controls for the level and evolution of key variables that
might be related to the timing of adoption of the new technology.
For a rst look at the raw data, we split the sample between counties that got access to TV relatively
early (before 1951) and those that got it late. We then run a regression of the polarization variable on
year-region dummies, and then calculate the mean of the residuals for each group of counties.
Figure 6 illustrates the result of the comparison for relative polarization. The key dates for the
introduction of TV, 1946 (marking the end of the wartime ban on television station construction) and
1952 (the end of the FCC freeze on new television licenses), are marked as vertical lines in the plot. We
see a remarkably clear decline after those periods, showing that relative polarization in those counties
that got TV early dropped dramatically in comparison with the relative polarization in the latecomer
counties. The downward trend starts as TV spreads in the groundbreaking counties, and picks up speed
as the second group joins the fold.
This picture suggests an eect of TV on polarization, but it it is essentially about correlations. A
45The impact of TV and radio on turnout was studied by Gentzkow (2006) and Stromberg (2004). We will see how our
results relate to their ndings.
46These events were World War II and an FCC-imposed freeze in new operation licenses, between 1948 and 1953, due to
spectrum allocation issues.
47Our empirical strategy for the introduction of TV closely follows Gentzkow (2006). While there is little reason to stray
from his convincing and well-established strategy, our main focus is on a dierent variable, polarization, and a dierent set
of predictions. As such, we will depart accordingly.
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Figure 6: Polarization in Pre-1951 Counties (Relative to Post-1951 Counties)
regression analysis enables us to implement the empirical strategy we have described. This strategy
translates into the following specication:
Yit = i + rt + TVit + Xit + it (3)
where i refers to county, t to years and r to census region. Note that we include county xed eects and
also region-year xed eects, which let us control for unobservable time trends that we allow to vary by
region. Yit is the outcome variable, and Xit stands for a set of control variables. We then estimate this
equation with the standard errors are all clustered at the level of congressional district.
In order to model the eect of TV, TVit, we again follow Gentzkow (2006) in looking at the number
of years since the introduction of TV in the county (\years of TV") { with 1946 being year zero for
all counties where TV was introduced before the end of World War II, since the penetration of TV
was essentially negligible until then. After all, this is the measure that encapsulates the idiosyncratic
variation introduced by the exogenous freezes, and it does so less crudely than a simple dummy variable
since we should expect any eect to be felt over time. Finally, we restrict our attention to the sample
between 1940 and 1968, to focus on the period over which TV was being introduced.
The results in Table 1 show a negative and signicant eect of TV on polarization, which is particularly
strong for our measure of relative polarization. The measure is quantitatively signicant: our coecients
would suggest that within the space of two decades exposure to TV would induce a decrease in relative
polarization that is around one standard deviation of the relative polarization sample. Note that the
even-numbered columns add a broader set of demographic controls, which include (the log of) population,
31population density, percent urban, percent non-White, and percent with high-school education.48 We
obtain very similar results for relative and absolute polarization, and also for lopsidedness.49 This is
entirely consistent with our Prediction 1.
As an additional check on the robustness of the results, we can look at the full sample, including the
counties that are split over more than one congressional district. This prevents us from clustering the
standard errors at the level of the congressional district, and for this reason we present the results when
they are clustered by county. Keeping this caveat in mind for the comparison, we can see in Table 2 that
the results are essentially the same for both relative and absolute polarization. Indeed, the coecients
prove to be remarkably stable. (The results are still present, though slightly weaker, when it comes to
the measure of lopsidedness.)
Having established the basic result, the next step in the strategy considers direct comparisons between
counties that look alike in some observable dimension that is likely to inuence the timing of introduction
of TV. Similarly to a matching strategy, the idea is to check whether, say, two rural counties that just
happened to dier in the timing of introduction { presumably due to exogenous reasons, for the most
part { displayed dierent trajectories in terms of polarization. We can do so for a number of observable
dimensions, splitting the sample according to terciles of those distributions; this is what Table 3 shows.
In this table, each entry corresponds to the coecient on \years of TV" that is obtained from running
a regression such as the one in Table 1.
We can see that the signs are unfailingly negative, and generally quite signicant { the few instances
of non-signicance are borderline (for the 10% level), with one single exception in the last line. In other
words, this underscores the evidence of a negative eect of TV on polarization.50 (The results are similar,
though not as strong in terms of signicance, for absolute polarization and lopsidedness.) All in all, we
see robust evidence if favor of or Prediction 1.
Table 3 also lets us go a little bit further in exploring the mechanisms predicted by the theory. In
particular, the dierences between terciles are illuminating: the drop in polarization is quantitatively
smaller in the poorer, less educated counties than in their richest, most educated counterparts. This is
not what one would have expected from the composition eect, and thus seems to indicate that the drop
48These demographic controls are obtained from Census data, and interpolated in order to ll in for the intervening years.
We have also measures of income and median age, but we do not include them because they are only available starting in
the 1950s. The regressions including those yield similar results for both relative polarization and lopsidedness, but they
show little eect of TV on absolute polarization. This seems to be due mostly to the drop in the sample, and not to the
inclusion of the additional controls.
49The results for polarization are robust to excluding from the sample the period during World War II, which may be
thought of as exceptional { one might argue that the war itself would have had a very strong impact on political behavior and
preferences. The coecients are slightly smaller, which is not surprising if we consider that the magnitude of the movements
in polarization is considerably stronger in the 1930s and 1940s than in the 1950s and 1960s, as shown by McCarty et al
(2006).
50Another strategy, also following Gentzkow (2006), is to control for the interaction between key demographic variables
(income, the log of population) in a base year and a fourth-order polynomial in time. This lets us control exibly for the
evolution over time of variables that might have been important in determining the timing of introduction of TV. Our
regression results also go through if we include these interactions, with the base year chosen to be 1960; these are available
upon request.
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Table 1. Effects of Years of TV on Political Outcomes, 1940-67 (Single-district counties) 
                     
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7)  (8) 
   relative  relative  absolute  absolute  lopsided  lopsided  turnout  turnout 
              
Years of TV  -0.0056***  -0.0055***  -0.0031**  -0.0034**  -0.3336**  -0.3336*  -0.1418*  -0.0129 
  [0.0018] [0.0018]  [0.0015]  [0.0014]  [0.1661] [0.1719] [0.0792]  [0.0796] 
              
Controls   No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Observations 27137  27079  27137  27079  26985  26968  26985  26968 
# of counties  2909  2900  2909  2900  2955  2955  2955  2955 
R-squared 0.072 0.074  0.068  0.069  0.137 0.139 0.615  0.625 
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered by congressional district (per decade). All regressions include county fixed effects and region-
year dummies. Controls are: log population, density, percent urban, percent nonwhite, and % high school. 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1            
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Effects of Years of TV on Political Outcomes, 1940-67 (All counties) 
             
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
   relative  relative  absolute  absolute  lopsided  lopsided  turnout  turnout 
              
Years of TV  -0.0055***  -0.0052***  -0.0023**  -0.0028***  -0.1580  -0.1915*  -0.2441***  -0.0728 
 [0.0011]  [0.0012]  [0.0011]  [0.0010]  [0.1025] [0.1081] [0.0564]  [0.0587] 
  
 
         
Controls   No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Observations  29597 29431  29597  29431  29331 29314 29331  29314 
#  of  counties  2966 2947  2966  2947  3002 3002 3002  3002 
R-squared 0.064 0.066  0.065  0.068  0.112 0.114 0.622  0.632 
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered by county. All regressions include county fixed effects and region-year dummies. Controls are: 
log population, density, percent urban, percent nonwhite, and % high school. 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1            
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Table 3. Effect of Years of TV on Relative Polarization, by Terciles 
 Lowest  Middle  Highest 
Counties partitioned by:     
Population -.0081***     
[.0031] 
-.0031*    
[.0017] 
-.0044***    
[.0017] 
Population density  -.0104**   
[.0042] 
-.0037**    
[.0017] 
-.0018    
[.0017] 
Percent urban  -.0061***    
[.0023] 
-.0039**    
[.0016] 
-.0048**    
[.0020] 
Family income  -.0021    
[.0017] 
-.0051**    
[.0023] 
-.0118***    
[.0030] 
% high school  -.0029*    
[.0015] 
-.0002    
[.0021] 
-.0150***    
[.0034] 
  
 
 
 
Table 4. Effect of Years of TV on Turnout, by Terciles 
 Lowest  Middle  Highest 
Counties partitioned by:     
Population  -.3515***      
[.1124] 
-.0420    
[.1008] 
-.1500*   
 [.0893] 
Population density  -.2444**    
[.1229] 
-.0427    
[.1025] 
-.0838    
[.0887] 
Percent urban  -.2359**    
[.1040] 
.0216    
[.1127] 
-.2450***    
[.0850] 
Family income  .1916**    
[.0925] 
-.1193    
[.1037] 
-.5880***    
[.0868] 
% high school  -.0115     
[.0968] 
-.1001    
[.1002] 
-.5700***    
[.0937] 
 
 
34in polarization might have been mostly due to the variety eect.
We can also look at the auxiliary prediction on turnout, as summarized by Prediction 2. We can look
at Columns (7)-(8) of Tables 1 and 2 to see that there is evidence of a negative eect, consistent with
what was found by Gentzkow (2006).51 Our Prediction 2, however, suggests that there is something more
to the eect of TV on turnout, depending on the substrate. Some of this subtlety can be seen in Table 4,
which repeats for turnout the exercise that was run in Table 3 for polarization. Most interesting here is
the variation across terciles. In the poorest, least educated terciles, the eect of introducing TV is much
less negative than in their wealthier, more educated counterparts { in fact, there is a signicant positive
impact of TV on turnout in the poorest counties.52 This is evidently consistent with the composition
eect: either the drop in turnout is much smaller (and insignicant) or the impact is even positive in the
least educated or poorest counties, where the impact of TV on political learning should be stronger.
However, we can test the mechanism underlying Prediction 2 more directly, by taking on the impor-
tance of the media substrate that our theory highlights. The \quasi-matching" strategy that we have
used above can be directly adapted to disentangle that issue. As we have mentioned, our theory suggests
that, in places where radio did not have a large presence, the eect of TV as a low-barrier medium in
increasing political knowledge would have been stronger. This would actually lead to a positive eect
on turnout, as more people are exposed to at least some political knowledge, or at least less negative,
as these \new" participants compensate for the \old" ones whom our theory suggests might tune o
because of a decrease in stakes driven by lower polarization within county.53
With that in mind, we run the regressions separately by quintiles of the distribution of radio penetra-
tion (measured by the share of dwellings with radio in 1940, from the Census).54 The results for turnout
(with 95% condence intervals) are depicted in Figure 7. We see a clearly negative pattern, whereby
there is a signicantly positive eect of TV on turnout in the counties that had been least exposed to
radio, as well as a signicantly negative eect in those counties that had been most exposed. This is
exactly what our theory would predict, as per Prediction 2.
We can use the same procedure for relative polarization, which is depicted in Figure 8. We do not
see the same clearly monotonic prole, although there is some evidence that the eect might be more
pronounced in counties with high levels of radio penetration. Since the level of variety aorded by TV is
even smaller than for radio, we would expect it to trigger the variety eect everywhere. The composition
eect, however, should be stronger for the counties with relatively low radio penetration. We might
thus take this as yet some more evidence that the variety eect is somewhat more important than the
51Note that our specication is dierent from Gentzkow's, mainly because we do not include lopsidedness as a control
variable { since we are interested in polarization as our main outcome of interest, we are led to think of it as a dependent
variable. In fact, including it increases the coecient in the turnout regressions.
52Gentzkow (2006) also nds that the negative eect he detects is substantially smaller in magnitude in the rst tercile.
53These old participants might also drop out due to lower consumption of local news, as suggested by Gentzkow (2006).
Our interpretation is certainly complementary to that.
54The quintiles are: 0-47, 47-68, 68-81, 81-88, 88-98.
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Figure 7: Eect of TV on Turnout, by Radio Penetration Quintile
composition eect, when it comes to driving the fall in polarization.
In sum, the evidence from the introduction of TV in the US points, quite robustly, at a causal eect
leading to lower polarization, which is statistically signicant and quantitatively important. In other
words, we nd support for Prediction 1. The evidence also seems to suggest that the variety eect was
prominent in driving that reduction in polarization { the reduction in polarization seems weaker in the
poorer, less educated counties where the composition eect would presumably be at its strongest. At the
same time, there is evidence that the logic behind the composition eect is also present, as the poorer,
less educated counties seem to have experienced an increase in turnout, in contrast with their richer,
more educated counterparts. Finally, we also nd evidence in favor of Prediction 2, as turnout increases
in those places where TV represented a lowering of barriers, and decreased where it would have been
mostly a decrease in variety.
4.5 Evidence from the Rise of Network Radio
Moving on to the radio predictions: how can we assess these in the data? What we do is collect from
primary sources [include the sources] the location and network aliation of all radio stations in the US,
which enables us to know the number of radio stations in each county as well as the subset of those that
were indeed aliated. Data limitations restrict us to the period after 1932, since our sources did not
include network aliation before then, and we limit our attention to the period before the entry of the
US into World War II, which substantially aected the radio industry across the country to an extent
that makes comparisons over time dicult.55 We also collect data on the transmission power of every
55In February 1942 the FCC imposed a freeze on new stations due to the wartime rationing, which lasted until August
1945. Most importantly from our perspective, the war also substantially aected content, by unleashing \programming
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Figure 8: Eect of TV on Relative Polarization, by Radio Penetration Quintile
radio station, since their reach would vary a lot depending on that power.56 We then weigh each station
by the square root of its power { because distance reached varies with that square root. We thus end up
with the power-weighted number of radio stations that are located in each county, which we term \radio
exposure", and its network component, (\network exposure"). This will give us an idea of the degree of
exposure to radio, and of the variety embedded in that exposure, that each county would have { albeit
an imperfect one, since radio signals evidently do not stop at county lines.
While the data do not aord us the kind of identication that the introduction of TV did, it is
nevertheless interesting to look at the correlations and what they say about Predictions 3 and 4. Starting
with the former, Table 5 shows a negative and signicant correlation between radio exposure and relative
polarization, in Column (1).57 This is entirely consistent with Prediction 3: the introduction of a low-
barrier medium such as radio would be expected to be associated with lower polarization. Column (2)
lets us go in greater depth into the prediction, as it shows that this correlation operates only through the
exposure to network stations, both in terms of signicance and size of the coecients. Once again, this
suggests a predominance of the variety eect, as was the case with the TV evidence: the composition
eect should not lead to much of a dierence between network and non-network radio. Note also that the
patriotism" (Sterling and Kittross 2002), which substantially blurred the distinction between network and non-network
stations in terms of uniformity. Consistent with this point, including the war period does confound the empirical results.
56The importance of this weighting is evident from the fact that network stations were typically much more powerful, by
an order of magnitude, than their unaliated counterparts. For instance, in 1935 the average American city would have just
over 3,000 watts of power coming from its average network station, and a mere 500W coming from its average unaliated
station.
57Note that we adopt the specication with all counties, as opposed to those with a single congressional district. This is
because a lot of the interesting variation, when it comes to dierences in network penetration, comes from large cities, which
are disproportionately left out when focusing on single-district counties. On the other hand, this underscores the caveat
that the variation in network exposure is far from exogenous.
37Table 5. Effects of Radio Exposure on Political Outcomes, 1932-41 (All counties) 
                     
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7)  (8) 
   relative  relative  absolute  absolute lopsided lopsided turnout turnout 
               
Radio 
Exposure -0.00014**  -0.00010**   -0.0061    0.0055*  
  [0.00006]  [0.00005]   [0.0040]  [0.0030]   
Network      -0.00019***    -0.00013***   -0.0015   0.0055* 
   [0.00006]    [0.00005]    [0.0031]    [0.0032] 
Non-Network   -0.00001  -0.00003  -0.0201  0.0059 
   [0.00016]    [0.00015]    [0.0127]    [0.0051] 
  
 
         
Observations 10623 10623 10623 10623  10665 10665 10665  10665 
# of counties  2521  2521  2521  2521 2574  2574  2574  2574 
R-squared 0.22  0.22  0.23  0.23 0.08  0.08  0.48  0.48 
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered by county. All regressions include county fixed effects and region-year dummies. Controls are: log population, 
density, percent urban, percent nonwhite. 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1            
 
same pattern is true when it comes to absolute polarization, as shown in Columns (3) and (4), although
the results are undistinguished when it comes to the measure of lopsidedness of elections.
When it comes to Prediction 4, on turnout, the results are less clear. Columns (7) and (8) show
some evidence of a positive correlation between exposure to radio and turnout, in line with the results
in Stromberg (2004). In this case, it seems that there is no particular distinction between aliated and
unaliated stations. The information / motivation impact of the introduction of the new medium seems
to have dominated any possible negative impact on turnout that lower polarization might have induced.
In sum, and with the caveat that no causality claim is warranted from this evidence, the results
are consistent with the idea that (network) radio had a similar depolarizing eect to that which TV
would also have later on. Also in line with the TV results, there is also evidence that such depolarizing
eect would have been attributable, to a substantial extent, to the variety eect predicted by the theory.
38Broadly speaking, we have good reason to believe that the evolution of media technologies between the
1930s and 1950s had a signicant role in the drop in polarization observed over that period.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has developed a framework that allows us to understand the impact of changes in media
technology on the distribution of political preferences, and thus on equilibrium levels of polarization.
Building on a simple model of how media exposure aects individual ideological positions, married to a
model of how these aect politicians' behavior through electoral competition, we identify two dierent
channels through which that impact takes place: the composition eect and the variety eect. The former
stems from the fact that exposure to media aects the levels of information and political motivation, and
hence turnout decisions. Because those levels, in turn, are generally dierent for ideologically moderate
individuals than for those who are ideologically extreme, this aects equilibrium polarization. The latter
eect arises from the inuence that media technologies exert over individuals' ideological views. As a
result, changes in the scope of ideological variety supplied by the media will also aect the distribution
of those views, and hence polarization.
In addition to that, we provide empirical evidence, gauged from the episodes of introduction of TV
and network radio in the US, that supports the prediction that these new technologies { since they implied
substantial decreases in variety and increases in accessibility { would engender reductions in polarization.
This suggests that the substantial reduction in polarization that occurred in the US around the mid-20th
century was helped by the changes in media environment, as had been suggested for instance by Prior
(2007). The evidence also enables us to try to disentangle the two eects predicted by the theory: it
seems that the variety eect, namely the direct impact of the media on individuals' ideological views,
was at the heart of the changes.
An important advantage of our theoretical framework is that it can be broadly applied, presumably
to any changes in media technology, which we codify simply according to accessibility and variety. For
instance, one could use it to think about the eects of recent changes, such as the diusion of cable TV
or the internet or even talk radio, which have all been accused of increasing polarization (Prior 2007,
Bishop 2008, Sunstein 2009). In particular, our evidence that the variety eect was more important
than the composition eect in explaining the eects of media technologies on polarization, for the case
of radio and broadcast TV in the US, does not imply that this would be the case in other contexts. Our
theory also suggests, and the data support, that the same technology could have very dierent eects
depending on the media substrate into which it is introduced. This could be especially interesting in
the context of comparing dierent countries: the introduction of the internet could have a very dierent
impact when it takes place in a context dominated by a high-variety medium (say, cable TV), as is
probably a good description for the US, than when the backdrop is state-owned broadcast TV. Such
39cross-country comparisons are also particularly interesting in that our theory suggests that dierences
in political institutions will aect the eects of media { it would be worthwhile to empirically check for
the predictions under a proportional representation system. We believe these are all exciting topics for
future research.
By the same token, future research may also focus on exploring the implications of our model of how
media aects preferences, and vice-versa. We have proposed a theory of the individuals' demand for
ideological variety, and it seems natural to extend the analysis to incorporate the supply side and the
equilibrium provision of variety. In the context of our model, this would involve endogenizing market
variety (M) and the \budget" allocated to media consumption { which would include the extensive
margin of choosing not to consume at all. This would connect naturally with the literature on media
slant, as in Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), towards a dynamic theory of how ideology evolves, tied to
issues such as technological features and regulation (switching costs, dierent sources of revenue such as
subscription vs advertising, etc.). These are some of the avenues that we intend to pursue.
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43A Proofs
A.1 Variety and Ideology
Proof of Proposition 1.
The demand (z;;M) for varieties of a consumer with ex-ante ideology z 2 X in a market with
variety M solves
max
2(M)
W(z;)  (jz   H(z;)j)   ():
The result is established by characterizing the solution to this problem.
If z = 2 (M) then, regardless of (), the optimal choice is (z;;M) = m(z): Indeed, this choice
achieves the smallest possible dissonance jz   H(z;)j across consumption plans  2 (M) and () 
(m(z)) = 0.
If z 2 (M) there are two cases. Either the optimal consumption involves switching or not. In the
rst case, assumption (A1) ensures that (z;;M) can be chosen so that H(z;(z;;M)) = z, i.e.,
zero dissonance. Without loss of generality, let (0) = 0. In general, unless z = m for m 2 M, the value
of a plan that leaves a consumer's ideology unchanged is (0)  =   (if z = m no switching is required
to achieve zero dissonance). The best plan without switching is m(z). It follows that the optimal plan
is switching i
  (jz   H(z;m(z))j) (4)
Since jz   H(z;m(z))j is an increasing function of jz   m(z)j, from (4) it follows that there exists
K() is an increasing function, such that if   K(jz   m(z)j) then (z;;M) can be chosen so that
H(z;(z;;M)) = z. Instead, if   K(jz   m(z)j) then (z;;M) = m(z). This, combined with
our observation for z = 2 (M) establishes (i) and (ii):
To show (iii), let (M) = [ ;+]. Suppose that z    so that m(z) =  . From (ii), the ex-post
ideology is given by x(z) = H(z; ) and, by assumption (A1), H(;) is increasing in its rst argument
from which x(z) is increasing for all z   . The case z  + is analogous. If M = (M) = fmg
so that   = +, we are done. Suppose instead that   < + and consider z 2 (M). Recall that
M = fm1;:::;mng with   = m1 and + = mn, and (M) can be partitioned into subintervals of the
form i = [mi;mi+1], where each of the extremes correspond to adjacent varieties oered in the market.
Note that if z = mi then (z;;M) = mi and H(z;(z;;M)) = z. To conclude the proof it suces to
show that H(z;(z;;M)) is increasing in z within each i. Observe that the largest distance between
a point in the interval and one of the extremes is the midpoint zmid
i = (mi + mi+1)=2 and the distance
to either mi or mi+1 is (mi+1   mi)=2. From (i) and (ii), we conclude that there exist m 
i ;m+
i 2 (M)
with m 
i < zmid
i < m+
i such that (i) if z 2 [mi;m 
i ) [ (mi;m+
i ] then  > K
 
jz   H(z;m(z)

j),
(z;;M) = mi for z 2 [mi;m 
i ) and (z;;M) = mi+1 for z 2 (mi;m+
i ]; (ii) if z 2 [m 
i ;m+
i ] then
  K (jz   H(z;mi)j) and (z;;M) is such that H(z;(z;;M)) = z. Clearly, H(z;(z;;M)) is
strictly increasing in each of the intervals [mi;m 
i ), [m 
i ;m+
i ]; and (mi;m+
i ]. Furthermore, H(m 
i ;mi) <
m 
i and H(m+
i ;mi+1) < m+
i : It follows that H(z;(z;;M)) is increasing on i, and thus, on  as
desired. 
Proof of Proposition 2.
Suppose that  = 0. For each balanced market variety M  X and (M) = [ ;+] is the variety
span. If M is balanced then   + k = +   k = b x. Given z 2 X let RM(z)  H(z;(z;;M)) be the
corresponding ex-post ideology and recall that GM(x) = G0(RM(x)): Invoking Proposition 1(i),
RM(x) =
8
<
:
H(x; ) if x <  
x if x 2 [ ;+]
H(x;+) if x > +:
To establish the result we consider an innitesimal increase in   and one in +. (Recall that for
 = 0 a balanced decrease in variety amount to increasing   and decreasing + by the same amount.
Assumption (A1)(H3) implies that H(x;) < H(x;0) if 0 > . It follows that
@H(x;)
@ > 0, from
which
@GM(x)
@  = g0(RM(x))
@H(x;)
@ > 0. 
44We conclude with an intuitive lemma that follows from proposition 1 and is used in the proof of
proposition 3. The proof is omitted.
Lemma 6 Suppose that  = 0 and x a market with variety M. If M0 is a balanced decrease in variety
with respect to M then gM0(b x)  gM(b x) with strict inequality if M0 = fb xg.
In words, since a reduction in variety leads to a compression of the distribution, it cannot reduce the
mass of voters with the median ideology.
A.2 Political Equilibrium: Analysis
We introduce some notation and terminology used in the proofs. Write  for the set of parameters of the
model. Let
y(z;) = b x  
c
2z
and
Q(z;) = pg(b x) + (1   p)g(y(z;))  
1
2
(x0R   x0L   z)
We say x is an interior equilibrium of the electoral game if xL0 < x
L < x
R < x0R.
Lemma 7 If x is an interior equilibrium of the electoral game then x = x
R x
L solves Q(x;) = 0.
Proof. Each candidate's policy must satisfy a rst order condition (FOC). For L the FOC is
@WL
@xL
(x
L;x
R)   (x
L   xL0) = 0:
Observe that under assumption (A4), @WL
@xL = @VL
@xL   @VR
@xL, where
@VL
@xL
=
1
2
pg(x1=2) + (1   p)g(yL)
@yL
@xL
and
@VR
@xL
=  
1
2

pg(x1=2) + (1   p)g(yR)
@yR
@xL

:
If G has unbounded support, yL(x) = x1=2   c
2(xR xL) and yR(x) = x1=2 + c
2(xR xL), from which
@yL
@xL =
1
2

1   c
2(xR xL)2

and
@yL
@xL = 1
2

1 + c
2(xR xL)2

. Now, for a symmetric equilibrium, we have that x
1=2 =
b x, x
L   xL0 = 1
2(x0R   x0L   x) and, since g is symmetric with respect to b x, g(yR(x)) = g(yR(x)).
Combining the previous, the FOC at an equilibrium point is
pg(b x) + (1   p)g(y(x;))  
1
2
(x0R   x0L   x) = 0; (5)
or Q(x;) = 0.
Lemma 8 Q(x;) = 0 has a solution 0 < x < xR0   xL0. Furthermore, the largest and smallest
solutions of Q(x;) = 0 in [0;xR0   xL0] satisfy
@Q
@z (x;) > 0. These two solutions are equilibria of
the electoral competition game.
Proof. Observe that Q(x0R   x0L;) = pg(b x) + (1   p)g(y(x;))  pg(b x) > 0 for all . On the other
hand, y(0;) =  1, so that g(y(x;)) = 0. It follows that Q(0;) = pg(b x)   1
2(x0R   x0L   x):
From assumption (P6), Q(0;) < 0. Since Q(0;) < 0, Q(x0R x0L;) > 0, and Q is continuous in its rst
argument, we conclude by the intermediate value theorem that Q(z;) = 0 for some z 2 (0;xR0 xL0).
Since Q(0;) < 0, for the smallest solution Q(z;) crosses the zero from below. Similarly, since
Q(x0R   x0L;) > 0, the same is true for the largest solution: It follows that
@Q
@z (x;) > 0 where x
is either the largest or smallest solution of Q(x;) = 0.
Finally, observe that Q(x;) = 0 follows from the candidates' necessary FOC. For the case of the
smallest and largest solution it can be shown that this FOC is associated with the unique best response
for each candidate.
45Lemma 9 Given the c.d.f. G and the corresponding p.d.f.g let rG(x;y) =
g(x) g(y)
G(x) G(y). If g is log-concave
then rG(x;y) 
g0(y)
g(y) for all y  x.
Proof. rG(x;y) 
g0(y)
g(y) for all y  x , S(x;y)  (G(x)   G(y))g0(y)  g(y)(g(x)   g(y))  0 for all y 
x: Note that S(y;y) = 0. Dierentiating S(x;y) with respect to x we get Sx(x;y) = g(x)g0(y) g(y)g0(x).
This is strictly positive for x  y as long as g is log-concave.
Proof of Proposition 3
(i) From lemma 7, an interior equilibrium satises Q(x;) = 0. It follows that @x
@p =  
@Q
@p =
@Q
@z . For
the highest and lowest equilibrium
@Q
@z > 0 (Lemma 8) Hence, if
@Q
@p < 0. then @x
@p > 0. Now,
@Q
@p
= g(b x)   g(y(x;)) > 0:
Similarly,
@Q
@c
=  (1   p)g0(y(x;))
1
x2;
which is less than zero if g is increasing at y(x;).
(ii) As argued in the main text, letting G = G(yR(x)) G(yL(x)) and y0 =
@y(x;)
@z = c
2x2 > 0 for
short,
@V 
@p
= G + 2(1   p)g(y(x;))y0@x
@p
and, from (i), letting g = g(b x)   g(y(x;)),
@x
@p
=  
@Q
@p
=
@Q
@z
=  
g
(1   p)g0(y(x;))y0 + 1
2
:
Thus, @V 
@p > 0 i
,

(1   p)g0(y(x;))y0 +
1
2


G   2(1   p)g(y(x;))y0g  0
, (1   p)y0

g0(y(x;))
g(y(x;))
  2
g
G

+
1
2
  0
, (1   p)y0

g0(y(x;))
g(y(x;))
  rG(b x;y(x;))

+
1
2
  0
where rG(x;y) =
g(x) g(y)
G(x) G(y) and we used G(yR(x))   G(yL(x)) = 2(G(b x)   G(y)). The latter follows
from symmetry. By Lemma 9,
g0(y)
g(y)   rG(x;y)  0 and the expression above is positive as desired. 
Proof of Proposition 4.
Let M be the market's ideological variety and GM be the associated distribution of citizens' ideologies.
If M is balanced with respect to b x, the market variety span can be expressed as (M) = [b x k; b x+k] for
some k > 0. The variety span is entirely determined by k, with larger k associated with more variety, we
write M = Mk. If Mk0 is a balanced decrease in variety with respect to Mk then k0 < k. To establish (i)
we show that an decrease in k is associated with an decrease of the equilibrium polarization level x(k)
for the (smallest and largest equilibrium) or, equivalently, x(k) is increasing in k.
(i) From Lemma 7 we have that the equilibrium level of polarization x(k) satises Q(x(k);) = 0,
where
Q(z;) = pgMk(b x) + (1   p)gMk(y(z;))  
1
2
(x0R   x0L   z)
46Since
@Q
@z > 0 for the smallest and largest equilibrium, x(k) increases with k if Q(z;) deceases with k.
From Lemma 6 gMk(b x)  gMk0(b x) if k0 < k. The corresponding change in gMk(y(z;)) has an ambiguous
sign. However, for p large enough the conclusion follows.
(ii) As illustrated in the main text the direct eect of the compression induced by the decrease in market
variety is to reduce turnout as, all else equal, those who do not turnout are precisely the moderates
with low motivation. The indirect eect derives from the change in turnout associated to the change in
platforms. From (i), this movement promotes moderation by the candidates which, in turn, is associated
with lower turnout by moderate citizens with low motivation. 
A.2.1 Proportional Representation
Under Assumption (A4') we can introduce denitions similar to the ones used for the analysis of electoral
competition under Assumption (A4) to obtain the comparative statics we are interested in. As before let
 be the parameters of the model and dene  =
g(b x)
jx0R x0Lj. The analogues of y(;) and Q(;) dened
above are given by
y(z;) = b x  
c
2jx0R   x0Lj
1
z
and
 (z;) = 

1 +
1 p
p
g(y(z;))
g(b x)

  (1   z)

1 +
1 p
p
G(y(z;))
G(b x)

:
The proofs of the following two Lemmas parallel those of Lemmas 7 and 8, and are thus omitted.
They are available upon request.
Lemma 10 If x is an interior equilibrium of the electoral game then  =
x
R x
L
xR0 xL0 solves  (;) = 0.
Lemma 11  (;) = 0 has a solution  2 (0;1). Furthermore, the largest and smallest solution of
 (;) = 0 satisfy @ 
@z(;) > 0: These two solutions correspond to equilibria of the electoral competition
game.
Proof of Proposition 5.
(i) From lemma 10, an interior equilibrium satises  (;) = 0. It follows that @
@p =  @ 
@p=@ 
@z. For
the highest and lowest equilibrium @ 
@z > 0 (Lemma 11.) Hence, if @ 
@p < 0. then @
@p > 0. Now,
@ 
@p
=
1
p2

 
g(y(;))
g(b x)
+ (1   )
G(y(;))
G(b x)

:
From  (;) = 0 we have that

1  =
1+
1 p
p
G(y(;))
G(b x)
1+
1 p
p
g(y(;))
g(b x)
so the above expression becomes
@ 
@p
=
(1   )

1 +
1 p
p
G(y(;))
G(b x)

p2

 r

g(y(;))
g(b x)

+ r

G(y(;))
G(b x)

where r(z)  z
1+
1 p
p z
. Our hypothesis that on the log-concavity of G implies that
g
G is decreasing. Since
y(;) < b x, we have that
g(y(;))
g(b x) >
G(y(;))
G(b x) . Since r() is increasing we conclude that @ 
@p < 0.
(ii) As argued in the main text, the direct eect of an increase in p on turnout is positive. In addition,
from (i) we have that the indirect eect on turnout (which arises from the change in platforms) as an
increase in polarization  without changing x1=2 = b x leads to higher turnout from citizens with low
political motivation. 
47B Switching costs and ideological compression
Let us explore in greater depth the model of media and ideology in Section 2.3, for a general level of
switching costs, . Note rst that, regardless of , if M = X then GM; = G0, as a result of proposition
1. In other words, if all ideologies are available, the distribution will not be aected by the media, as
individuals can always nd a perfect match for their initial view. (If   0 this equality remains if
the much weaker condition (M) = X holds, as in this case individuals can always combine existing
media to construct an exact match.) By the same token, if there is minimal variety (M = fmg), then
GM; is independent of  as well. Furthermore, if m = b x where b x is the median of G0 then GM; is a
compression of G0. We can thus see that, in going from one extreme of complete variety to the other
of minimal variety, our intuition is conrmed regardless of : However, the following example illustrates
how monotonicity is not guaranteed in general, as depending on  a relatively low supply of ideological
variety can either compress or disperse the ideologies of citizens.
Example 2 Suppose that X = [ 1;1] and assume the market has two ideological varieties, m1 =  1=2
and m2 = 1=2; i.e., M = f 1=2;1=2g. This implies that (M) = [ 1=2;1=2]. The distribution of prior
ideologies G0 is a symmetric triangle distribution with support X, it's median is b x = 0. For concreteness
we consider the linear inuence function given by (1).
For  = 0, from proposition 1 (i) and (1), we have that the support of the new distribution becomes 
 1
2   a1
2; 1
2 + a1
2

and
RM;(x) =
8
> <
> :
x (1 a)(  1
2)
a if x 2

 1
2   a1
2; 1
2

x if x 2 [ 1=2;1=2]
x (1 a)( 1
2)
a if x 2
 1
2; 1
2 + a1
2

:
Using this and (2) it's easy to verify that the distribution GM; is a compression of G0.
Assuming  is large enough so that 1(ii) holds for all ideologies, we have that the support of the new
distribution is the union of the intervals

 1
2   a1
2; (1   a)1
2

and

(1   a)1
2; 1
2 + a1
2

, and
RM;(x) =
(
x (1 a)(  1
2)
a if x 2

 1
2   a1
2; (1   a)1
2

x (1 a)( 1
2)
a if x 2

(1   a)1
2; 1
2 + a1
2

:
In contrast to the case  = 0, GM; is a dispersion of G0:
The example suggests that if a society or group of consumers is initially deprived from media access
and then gains access to a relatively low-variety media environment, their preferences may become more
or less concentrated, depending on the cost . For instance, the introduction of a duopoly of newspapers
with dierent editorial lines could be associated with a dispersion if conscientious readers are a negligible
fraction (say, due to subscription pricing or spatial segregation in the distribution), or with a compression
if the opposite holds. Note also that the example suggests that, with negligible switching costs, the model
does exhibit the monotonicity property, which does not apply to the model with high costs.
48Table A1. Effect of Ideological Extremism on Likelihood of Watching Both Fox News and MSNBC 
 
Probit regressions, robust standard errors in brackets. All regressions include as controls the response to the question on attention to hard 
news (hardnews) and individual ideology (ideo). The measure of extremism is defined as the absolute value of (ideo – 2), since 2 is the value 
that corresponds to “moderate”. Demographic controls are: sex, marital status and race dummies, age, education, income. The sample 
includes only individuals who answered “Regularly” or “Sometimes” to the question of how often she watches Fox News or CNN or MSNBC, 
and excludes individuals who did not answer one of the demographic questions. 
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 
Source: Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, April 2008 Media Survey: Audience Segments in a Changing News Environment: 
Key News Audiences Now Blend Online and Traditional Sources (Aug 17, 2008). 
 
  (1) (2) (3)
      
Extremism ‐ 0.1112
[0.0803] 
‐0.1402*
[0.0813] 
‐0.1534*
[0.0859] 
Demographic Controls  Yes Yes
State FEs  Yes
 
Observations  617 616 603
R‐Squared  0.003 0.043 0.095
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